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Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict
between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords
Abstract
There have been a number of legislative, caselaw and academic attempts at trying to resolve the conflict
between the non-discrimination rights of gay and lesbian couples seeking housing and the free exercise rights
of religious landlords who don't believe they should rent to unmarried couples. The academic writing often
tries to resolve this conflict either by minimizing the harm to one of the parties (e.g., by categorizing the
landlord's harm as merely commercial, or the tenant's as merely a problem of housing availability) or denying
the relative importance of one of the party's rights. Others attempt a more positivist approach, arguing that
the Free Exercise Clause or statutory demands or exemptions easily solve the problem. Most of these attempts
presume that a liability approach is the only way in which such rights-vs-rights conflicts can be resolved: i.e.,
one party's rights are superior, entitling him or her to a full panoply of remedies. With a hotly contexted public
moral issue, however, an all-or-nothing civil rights liabilities approach may exacerbate cultural conflict rather
than moving society toward resolution. Exploring the gradually changing remedies approach of the Fair
Housing Act as a possible model, this article argues that, in the early stages of recognizing the rights of gay/
lesbian couples to non-discrimination in housing when such rights remain contested, awarding the right to the
couple while significantly limiting their remedies is the best way to encourage dialogue in the midst of severe
difference and eventually social resolution of these issues.
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REMEMBERING MRS. MURPHY:
A REMEDIES APPROACH TO THE CONFLICT




Mrs. Murphy, invented in the heat of battle during Congressional debates
over the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 has come back to haunt us.
She is the mythical poor widow who did not wish to rent a room in her
boardinghouse to an African American. In the political conservative account,
she was the everywoman whose dignity and freedom the state should not
deny by saddling her with tenants whom she would not choose as friends.
2
Copyright 0 2001, Marie A. Failinger.
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. Thanks to my research
assistant, Heather Toft.
I The "Mrs. Murphy Boardinghouse" exemption originated with the public
accommodation section, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and was introduced into Title
VIII, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, through an amendment offered by
Kentucky Sen. John Cooper. James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of
the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 605,607-08
(1999). See 131 CONG. REC. S429-07 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Stafford)
(giving Sen. George Aiken from Vermont credit for proposing the "Mrs. Murphy" clause for
Title II to help break the legislative logjam on the FHA). Senator Walter Mondale and Edward
Brooke introduced a similar amendment, 114 CONG. REC. S2495 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1968)
(remarks of Sen. Mondale). Senator Stennis objected to the fact that the amendment did not
track "[t]he original Mrs. Murphy exemption contained in the 1966 bill [which] provided
that-nothing contained in this bill shall be construed to prohibit or affect the right of any
person, or his authorized agent, to rent or refuse to rent, a room or rooms in his home for any
reason, or for no reason; or to change his tenants as often as he may desire." 114 CONG. REC.
S3345 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1968).
2 See Walsh, supranote l,at608-10; 114CoNG. REc. 3345(dailyed. Feb. 19,1968)
(remarks of Sen. Stennis and Sen. Long); 114 CONG. REc.$3758-59 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1968)
(remarks of Sen. Holland, who complained about those who were trying "to push [the Fair
Housing Act] down the throats of millions of American people who do not want such an
amendment"). Senator Sam Ervin called the Fair Housing laws the "forced housing laws" and
complained, "I cannot see where it is the duty of the Congress to rob every American who has
residential property... of the right to sell or rent his property to whom he pleases. We have
gotten like the Communists. They talk of the 'People's Democratic Republic, when they are
speaking of governments which are dictatorships .... 114 CONG. REC. S2533 (daily ed. Feb. 6,
1968).
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For her, Congress passed a blanket exemption to the public accommodation
and fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act, excluding certain
boarding houses and owner-occupied housing of no more than four units.
3
For some conservatives and traditional liberals, the Mrs. Murphy exemption
has been a sort of watchword about the dangers of federal government
intrusion into private life.4 For progressives, she is a tragic reminder of the
failure of the law to live up to the promise of the civil rights movement.
5
We need speculate to only some extent on what Mrs. Murphy and her
fellow small landlords have been doing over these thirty-five years since they
were exempted from the public accommodation and Fair Housing Act
provisions of the Civil Rights Act.6 The evidence suggests that the aged Mrs.
Murphy may still be refusing to rent her rooms to African Americans, given
that over half of all African Americans and Latinos report discrimination in
the rental and purchase of housing.7 However, it may be that, like most
Americans, including some of segregation's most celebrated opponents,
8
Mrs. Murphy has come to believe that racial discrimination is odious, that
3 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2000); S. Rep. 721, Pub.
L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 803(2) (b), 82 Stat. 73 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
100-01, 1837.
4 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note i, at 607-08; Roger Clegg, Epilogue: Civil Rights in the
Eighties and Nineties, 54 LA. L. REv. 1605, 1612-13 (1994); 114 CoNG. REc. S2533 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 114 CONG. REc. S3345 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1968)
(remarks of Sen. Stennis); 114 CONG. REc. S3424 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (remarks of Sen.
Ervin).
5 See, e.g., Julian Bond, Historical Perspectives on Fair Housing, 29 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 315, 316-21 (1996).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972) (referring to § 3603(b)(2) as exempting "'Mrs. Murphy's now renowned
rooming-house."); Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that
landlords were exempt from FHA lawsuit because of the Mrs. Murphy exemption).
7 See, e.g., Bond, supra note 5, at 317 (reporting that African American families
wishing to buy a home face a 59% chance of encountering housing discrimination and Latino
families face a 56% chance, while these groups have a 50% chance of facing discrimination in
rental housing, according to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)). See
also 134 CONG. REC. E2252-01 (remarks of Rep. Hayes) (daily ed. June 29, 1998) 1988 WL
173469 (noting that housing discrimination cases numbered two million per year, and that
black families have a 48% chance of encountering racial discrimination in buying homes and a
72% chance in renting homes).
8 As the most famous example, George Wallace, who tried to stop black students from
entering the University of Alabama and made an early career largely on a segregation and anti-
federal government platform, has not only become an integrationist, but has been recognized
for his efforts to promote African Americans into public positions. See Matthew Cooper,
Legacy of a Healed Hater, George Wallace, 1918-1998, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1998, at 51.
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even to suggest that discrimination on the basis of race is acceptable is
beyond the pale. Indeed, the rising jury verdicts in housing race
discrimination cases bear out that American attitudes toward such
discrimination are changing.9 One sensible way to read these apparently
conflicting statistics is that when a person of color comes to rent from her,
Mrs. Murphy may demur, not out of deliberate, "mean-spirited" racism which
she knows is wrong, but because she continues (consciously or
unconsciously) to harbor stereotypes about people of other races.10 This is
an American reality that makes enforcement of the Fair Housing Act a
continuing struggle in the national housing market, and the promise of a
color-blind society elusive.
Now Mrs. Murphy's successor is in the legal spotlight for refusing to rent
to unmarried couples, gay or straight." 1 In the current debate, the iconic
landlady is most sympathetically portrayed as a woman whose religious
conscience will not permit her to cooperate in evil, even though the society
around her seems to mock her traditional moral values. 12 Her fight to protect
"sacred" property as a value seems secondary, though some commentators
continue to press property rights as an important part of her claim. 
13 This
9 See Bond, supra note 5, at 319.
10 See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Micro Aggression, in CRnTCAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTrNG ExE 169-71 (1995) (describing the views of Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317
(1987)).
11 The cases on this issue are still being decided in the state courts and the issue of
unmarried tenant applicants and religious landlords was the topic of a panel at the American
Association of Law Schools annual meeting in January 2000. Sponsored by the Sections on
Law and Religion and Gay and Lesbian Issues, the meeting included presentations by
Professors Thomas Berg and Michael McConnell, whose work is referred to herein.
12 See Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Minn. 1990); Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 277-78 (Alaska 1994). See also Stephanie Hammond
Knutson, The Religious Landlord and the Conflict Between Free Exercise Rights and Housing
Discrimination Laws-Which Interest Prevails? 47 HAsTINGs L.J. 1669, 1672-93 (1996).
13 The importance of property rights was frequently cited in opposition to the Fair
Housing Act; see Leland Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisions
of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 59,71 (1993) (quoting
Sen. Ervin); 114 CONG. REC. S3135 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Ellender, who
claimed that with the Fair Housing Act:
[e]very cherished liberty purchased at a high cost in Anglo-American
history over the centuries is cast aside. All personal rights and liberties of
the individual are ripped away for the alleged purpose of preventing
discrimination. All the personal liberties wrung from the sovereigns from
the Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights are trampled underfoot. If this
(continued)
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battle is not so national or pervasive as the battle over housing rights for
African Americans, which galvanized national attention in the wake of city
riots exposing the reality that America was literally becoming, in the Kerner
Commission's words, "two societies-one white and one black." 14 Rather,
the new battle is being fought out more quietly, state by state, case by case,
and year by year, due largely to the fact that Congress has never determined
to eradicate discrimination based on marital status. 15 Thus, unmarried
couples have resorted to state human rights legislation to demand their civil
rights in housing; and in several states, they have been successful, though not
as successful as other groups. 16
amendment becomes law, those guaranteed rights will be nothing but lies
and dead concepts... Nothing so monstrous has been perpetrated on
civilized people since the French and Russian Revolutions... Equality is
the last refuge of the trifling, the shiftless and the incompetent.
Id.; 114 CONG. REC. S3755 (daily ed, Feb. 21, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Byrd, who noted that
property rights were basic human rights existing before the Constitution, including in the
Eighth Commandment, and risked destruction by the bill). See also 144 CONG. REC. S44-02
(daily ed. Apr. 1, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Symms, who objected that the Fair Housing Act
Amendment handicap provision "makes a mockery of the concepts of individual liberty and
private property" and complained that the federal government would be telling property
owners how big their bathrooms and kitchens must be).
14 See Bond, supra note 5, at 324; Ware, supra note 13, at 73-74; 114 CoNG. REC.
3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale), noting:
We are.., fighting for the minds and hearts of the vast middle ground of
responsible Negroes, who have persevered in their commitment to
progress through the courts and through the legislative process. The black
racists are fighting to make these Negroes believe that white American is
basically indecent... On the outcome of this crucial struggle hangs the
future of this Nation. If the racists and extremists win, we face a real
possibility of guerilla warfare in our major cities, lasting notjust a few hot
summer days, but for years--a Vietnam here at home ....
15 This omission is telling, given that several states added marital status a decade or two
ago to their civil rights laws. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(a) (amended § 11, ch. 104,
SLA (1975)); CA. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a) (amended Stats. 1975, c. 1189, p. 2943); MmN.
STAT. ANN. 363.03 subd. 2. (1) (added Laws 1973, c. 729 § 3). Congress' 1988 expansion of
the Fair Housing Act has added disability and family status (that is, having children) to race,
color, creed, and national origin as prohibited categories for making housing decisions. See 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(f) (1994).
16 Although at least ten states have adopted marital discrimination laws, some do not
include housing discrimination. Others adopt a similar "Mrs. Murphy-type" exemption for
owners occupying a unit in their four-plexes, one state exempts all four-unit buildings, and
(continued)
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While Mrs. Murphy's moral views on racial segregation have quite
clearly lost the day in American society, she can be expected to linger as a
figure in the American legal imagination, though her name in this battle is
Mrs. Smith (or Mr. French). 17 For those who tell her legend, she is one
version of the independent, plain-speaking American hero with many faces,
the lone pioneer who makes her own way now in harsh social territory,
indifferent to the hypocrisy of the "civilized" (now termed "politically
correct") community's attempts to coerce her into adopting the moral
fashions of the day. Or in the silver screen version of that American legend,
she is the Norma Rae or Erin Brockovich who stands up to say "no" to the
great bureaucracies who threaten to crush the little person, having lost sight
of the greater good. Conversely, for those who shudder at her intransigence,
Mrs. Murphy---or Mrs. Smith--stands for the implacable human will, too
steeped in its own ignorance, cruelty and unwillingness to acknowledge the
truly Other as deserving respect and care. More abstractly, the Mrs. Murphys
and Mrs. Smiths represent perhaps the most intractable cases our
constitutional courts must adjudicate: those cases in which deeply cherished
rights are pitted against each other, where vindication of one person's rights
must necessarily abrogate conflicting rights of another.
Without arguing that Senator Mondale was right to introduce Mrs.
Murphy into the public debate over fair housing, and certainly not defending
the legacy of racial discrimination that Congressional compromises left
behind, I would suggest that advocates on both sides of brewing civil rights
disputes, particularly over gay rights, might gain from paying heed to the
compromising approach of the Fair Housing Act authors. Of course,
commentators continue to debate whether Congressional and court decisions
to compromise principles for acceptability in the 1960s and 1970s made it
more possible for racial change to occur without civil war, or whether their
choices simply shored up racial intransigence, deepened and solidified the
tragic complex of racial discrimination, poverty, violence and hopelessness,
and permanently ended the promise of equal opportunity for many minority
Americans. 18 This article should not be read as an implicit contribution to
either side of that debate, though it is clear that as we work through racial
issues in American society, the long perspective of history will be confronted
by the lingering, pervasive reality of racially prejudicial social choices that
others exempt all religious landlords from their ambit See Knutson, supra note 12, at 1695-
1713.
17 See, e.g, Smith v. Fair Employment Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996),
(holding that a landlord who refused to rent to an unmarried couple was not exempted from
housing discrimination laws because of her religious beliefs); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2
(Minn. 1990) (holding that refusal to rent to an unmarried couple did not constitute statutory
discrimination on the basis of marital status).
18 See, e.g., Bond, supra note 5, at 316-21, 324.
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pervade our life. This article will focus on fair housing as one of many
emerging civil rights struggles that pit strong social, political and moral
beliefs firmly against each other, and will consider how American society
could resolve these conflicts in a way that respects the human dignity of
those involved in the disputes and what they might teach us about the human
condition.
I will also suggest that, in fiercely fought civil rights struggles, a
jurisprudential strategy that incorporates a complex, reality-based
perspective--even accepting the possible need for strategic compromises at
certain points of history-is not necessarily an evil, depending precisely on
the nature of the civil rights claim that presents itself. Nor does openness to
legal compromise of opposing moral claims in these civil rights disputes
necessarily mean that we must accept the Mrs. Murphy solution, such as
preferring the rights of those who disagree with civil rights progress by fully
exempting some businesses from the operation of civil rights laws. 19 Rather,
I will argue that remedies, not rights, may offer a more effective way to work
through contested civil rights battles with due respect for the dignity of all
parties involved. In fact, remedies deliberately planned to change over time
along with solidifying social consensus about the wrongfulness of
discrimination against minorities like gays and lesbians may provide a more
lasting solution to these social battles than all-or-nothing solutions that marry
rights and remedies. Such remedies should address both parties to the
dispute as persons of conscience, as people who should be expected to
encounter the moral claim of the Other with whom they do battle. Indeed,
such legal remedies should be shaped around an imagination that civil rights
opponents are human beings who are as willing to repair their moral mistakes
19 A number of states have accepted the exemption solution where marital
discrimination and other forms of discrimination are concerned. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-34-502(8)(a)(11) (2000) (exempting owner-occupied dwellings of up to four units from
familial status discrimination law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-4(a)(1) and (2) (1993) (exempting
landlords who live on the premises and rent one other unit and landlords who live on the
premises and rent four rooms or fewer from housing discrimination law); MD. CODE ANN. art.
49B § 21(aX2) (1994) (owner exempt from marital or sex discrimination prohibitions if rooms
are rented in owner's principal residence, or if owner occupies and rents no more than five
units in a building); MICH. Cohie. LAWS. ANN § 37.2503(l)(a) and (b) (West 1996) (excluding
owner-occupied duplexes and rental of rooms in owner's house); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02
subd. 2(b) and (c) (West 1991) (excluding resident owner of duplexes from sexual orientation
discrimination law); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (11) (1997) (excluding owner-occupied
homes or duplexes from age and familial discrimination statute); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A: 13 1 (a), (b) and (c) (1995) (excluding three-unit owner-occupied houses and five-room
boarding houses); N.Y.ExEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(3) (McKinney 1998); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 49.60.222(2)(c) (West 1998) (excluding owner occupied buildings of up to four units);
Knutson, supra note 12, at 1728-29.
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as to stand firm in their moral convictions. Such remedies, to be effective,
should recognize that the process of getting individuals to see their moral
error is a tremendously difficult and slow process for most, one that has no
assurance of success. Indeed, the process of opening the eyes of civil rights
wrongdoers carries a high risk of continuing or even escalating victimization,
as the moral perpetrator comes to see and take responsibility for his error.20
In making this argument, the narrative I will use is the one which I
believe presents the most intractable dilemma, because the claims of both
parties are the most compelling. That narrative is of Mrs. Smith, a landlady,
who because of strongly held, sincere religious beliefs feels impelled to
refuse accommodations to tenants who are living in a sinful situation, in her
view. In that narrative, Mrs. Smith is directly confronted by prospective
tenants Mary and Martha or David and Jonathan (call them the Joneses), a
lesbian or gay couple committed to making a family together, who are having
difficulties finding housing in part because of social disapproval of their kind
of family.
My narrative also assumes that both Mrs. Smith and the couple have
reason to believe that they already have some real civil rights that they are
properly concerned about losing. Mrs. Smith has rights to religious freedom
embodied in state and federal constitutions as well as state human rights laws
prohibiting religious discrimination. 2 1 The Joneses' equality rights--their
rights not to suffer discrimination solely on the basis of their sexual
orientation--are recognized by local ordinances, 22 state statutes, 23 and at
least one fair reading of the United States Supreme Court's constitutional
opinion in Romer v. Evans.24 While it seems clear, looking over the past
century of constitutional litigation and statutory extension, that Mrs. Smith's
civil rights are older than those of the Joneses, both of them currently rest on
somewhat fragile legal ground from a positivist perspective, as I will suggest
20 See, e.g., Charles Villa-Vicencio, The Reek of Cruelty and the Quest for Healing-
Where Retributive and Restorative Justice Meet, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 165, 185 (1999-2000)
21 See, e.g., Knutson, supra note 12, at 1683-86.
22 See Thomas Weathers, Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals Adequately Protected
from Discrimination in Housing and Employment? 42 PAc. L.J. 541, 571-73 (1993).
23 See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12955 (West 2000). See also CONN. GEN. STAT ANN.
§ 46a-81 e(a)(1) (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151B § 4 (6) (West 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN § 363.03 subd. 2. (a) and (b), 363.12 (2) (2) (West 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN §
354-A: 10 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (g)(1) and (2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws 1956
§ 11-24-2.2 (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN § 106.04(1) (West 2000).
24 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see Jerald W. Rogers, Note, Romer v. Evans: Heightened
Scrutiny Has Found a Rational Basis-Is the Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect Status
for Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996) (arguing that Romer
stands for the rule that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class in reality).
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later. In order to find a way forward, however, I will assume that both Mrs.
Smith and the Joneses can plausibly claim violations of their human rights.
Of course, landlords whose objections to such couples are morally but
not religiously based, or are merely matters of personal distaste, as well as
those who simply believe that the government should not interfere with
property decisions, will also be affected by the resolution of this most
difficult dispute.25 Heterosexual couples will also be affected, not just those
whose decision not to marry is purely selfish, but also those who remain
unmarried for more sympathetic reasons: consider couples facing severe
economic losses (such as Social Security or pension benefits) if they marry;
those threatened by former spouses or other family members on religious
rejection if they re-marry; those who may be unable to convince partners to
marry; or those that may be afraid to marry because of painful past
experiences.26 Whether these sorts of reasons change the balance of harms
or of rights is not something I will attempt to resolve, though they do make
the choices with respect to both liability and remedy much more difficult.
II. THE LIABILITY APPROACH: SOME FALSE STARTS
In the cases and literature on the religious landlord/unmarried couple
conflict, commentators have tended to commit four errors that are fatal to a
satisfactory moral resolution of the conflict. One error is to deny the
significance of the harm to each of the parties in the dispute if the other wins.
The second is to deny the importance of the rights each party raises, or
suggest the obvious superiority of one set of rights over another. The third
error is to run straight for the law: for example, to assume that resorting to
the Free Exercise Clause, or to the religious exemption in the Fair Housing
Act, will automatically justify a result in the case, without considering the
implications of such a result.
The final error, one which the remedies approach addresses most directly,
is to assume that the law's approach to the problem must be all or nothing.
Either the state must exempt the landlord and thereby validate her religious
beliefs, or the state must vindicate the couple's civil rights and rain the entire
remedial power of the state upon the landlord's head. All four of these
mistakes not only fail to resolve the Kulturkampf that Justice Scalia would
25 A number of the marital status discrimination cases have not involved solely moral
issues, but have been based on the landlord's views about the financial and social suitability of
single tenants. See, e.g., Atkisson v. Kern Co. Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 377 (Ct. App.
1976) (in addition to concern over morality, a landlord cited turnover of cohabitants, lack of
cohabitant's responsibility, and his poor influence on the tenant); Hess v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1982) (landlord cited financial considerations).
26 Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything you Wanted to Know about Lesbians and Gay
Men, Their Families, and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1998).
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say is at the heart of these cases, 27 but also fail to open a space for dialogue
about what is at stake among the parties.
A. Error One: Only the Harm to One of the Parties Should be Taken
Seriously
Refusal to acknowledge that significant harm is occurring to one party or
another is often an easy way to approach rights versus rights conflicts in law.
If the harm to one party is not great, his corresponding right can be taken
much less seriously. This denial-of-harms approach is particularly attractive
in the religious landlord/gay tenants struggle since the perspectives on each
side of the conflict are so different. Mrs. Smith can hardly begin to imagine
what her tenants are experiencing when .she denies them an apartment any
more than she can imagine why they choose the relationship they do. Nor
can her tenants imagine how she could not see the insult to them, or in some
cases, how she could believe in a religion that treats them with such disdain,
or in a God who condemns rather than celebrates them as persons and their
relationship. Indeed, each party has strong motivation to refuse to imagine
the other's pain, because the conflict is as much moral and social as it is a
conflict of practical interests.
In the landlord/tenant conflict, the easiest way to discount the harm to
Mrs. Smith is to treat it as largely a matter of money. In practical terms, the
argument says, if a state enforces its civil rights statute on behalf of
unmarried couples, Mrs. Smith's easiest choice is to forego the opportunity
to participate as an entrepreneur in the commercial economy.28 She can
simply sell her boardinghouse or apartments to someone else and find
anotherjob where she is not forced to violate her religious beliefs, or use her
property for some other purpose than a public rental facility. This argument
makes much of the Supreme Court's distinction between the highly protected
right to intimate association---the right to decide whose lives will be closely
intertwined with one's own-and the lesser-protected social and economic
associations, where one's need for intimacy, warmth, and security is
27 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, Collisions ofLiberty and Equality
in American Public Law, 106 YAMn L.J. 2411, 2413-15 (1997) (discussing the origins of the
concept of Kulturkarnpf in German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's attempt to control and
domesticate the Roman Catholic Church, and arguing that the most prominent examples of
such Kulturkampf in the United States were the Court decisions in the Mormon persecution
cases and in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
28 Walsh, supra note 1, at 631; Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909 (Cal. 1996); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,283-84 (Alaska
1994).
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attenuated.29 Indeed, the argument rests on the so-called public/private split:
the notion that modem people inhabit two worlds--the private world of
nurturance and protection, which must be shielded from both government and
public interference; and the rough-and-tumble public world where
marketplace survival rules and civil force governs.30 Mrs. Smith, her critics
claim, can withdraw to her private world where the courts will protect her
associational choices, and find another means of economic support if she
wishes to follow her conscience.
Of course, in the original Civil Rights Act narrative, Mrs. Murphy's
boardinghouse was exempted in part because her story imagined people
whose commercial ventures were of the close, intimate nature that the Court
is describing in the right-to-intimate-association cases. Mrs. Murphy would
be sharing bathrooms, meals, and daily company with those she boarded, as
would tenants to whom she rented the other two or three apartments in her
building.31 Moreover, Mrs. Murphy did not have any real kind of economic
choice; she was an aging widow, whose only realistic means of income was
to rent out her rooms.32 Thus, either the demands of the private world or
economic necessity justified the leeway Mrs. Murphy was given to
discriminate among boarders or tenants.
By contrast, those who would discount her cohort Mrs. Smith's right to
choose not to rent to unmarried couples are quick to embrace the
public/private distinction as a way to minimize the interest which Mrs. Smith
claims. Unlike Mrs. Murphy, most modem landlords-even those in owner-
occupied buildings-are not likely to be cooking meals for their tenants,
sitting around the fireplace with them or doing their wash. Indeed, they may
never see their tenants from day to day, sharing not even a dwelling entrance
with them. If only very intimate associations count as a basis for protecting
Mrs. Smith's claim that she not be coerced into a relationship against her
29 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984); Bd. of Directors v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 542 (1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988); Marie Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates:
A Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV.
143, 148-52 (1987).
30 See, e.g., PAMICK R. KEIFERT, WELCOMING THE SmTANGER: A PUBUC THEOLOGY OF
WORsHIP AND EVANGELISM 31-34 (1992).
31 See 114 CONG. REC. 55 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1968); 114 CoNG. REc. 2534 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale); Walsh, supra note 1, at 607 (quoting Sen. Mondale's
claim that the Mrs. Murphy exemption was aimed at those "who, by the direct personal nature
of their activities, have a close personal relationship with their tenants." 114 CONG. REc. 2459
(1968). See also Sen. Hubert Humphrey's point that "the [Mrs. Murphy] relationships
involved in such situations are clearly and unmistakably of a much closer and more personal
nature than in the case of major commercial establishments." Walsh, supra note I, at 608.
32 Walsh, supra note 1, at 609.
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religious beliefs, as the Supreme Court's association cases may be read to
suggest, 33 Mrs. Smith is in trouble. An owner of four units, Mrs. Smith does
not live in any of them,34 so her claim to interference with her intimate
associational rights is implausible in this view.
35
Virtually all of the cases that have reached the courts do not involve
major real estate moguls; they involve landlords with a few rental units who
are trying to take some personal responsibility for their tenants, albeit
initially through imposing behavioral rules on them.36 While in theory these
landlords can simply exit the housing market if they do not like its rules, the
personal investment they have made in purchasing, caring for, and renting out
their housing is more than economic (though economically such units may
literally represent their life savings). Most of these individual landlords have
made an investment of their lives as well, an investment that, like a doctor's,
requires them to be on call at all hours. It is an investment that requires them
to make moral (and possibly sacrificial) decisions such as whether to trust a
tenant who falls behind in the rent to pay next month, or to invest the energy
to evict her, and whether to call a tenant on the carpet for troublesome
behavior or simply not renew his lease. They have thus chosen to intertwine
their personal lives to some extent within the close community of people who
live under their roof, and the more public community in the neighborhood
where their buildings are located, whether they are owner-occupied or not.
Indeed, to discount Mrs. Smith's occupation as a landlady as merely
commercial or economic is to discount the possibility that she may be
33 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 851 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
34 Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996).
35 See, e.g., Senior Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that plaintiffs' right of association was not violated because such aright would
"stop at the [plaintiffs'] front door").
36 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 909 (refusal to
rent duplex to unmarried couple engaged in sinful activity by person with five total units);
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991), review granted
and superseded by Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
review dismissed and cause remanded by Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 859
P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (landlord refused to rent rooms to unmarried couples in order to avoid
cooperating in their sinful activity); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d
274, 277, 279 (Alaska 1994). But see, e.g., Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187
Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1990) (holding that the landlord's
discrimination against single roommates, which was based only on financial considerations,
was not a defense to a marital status discrimination claim, as the landlord could hold both
roommates liable for the rent).
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providing housing out of a sense of vocation, believing either that God has
called her to provide homes for people or, more secularly, that she is trying to
respond to an important social need using her particular talents and
resources. 3
7
To honor the personal investment of a landlord in her properties and her
tenants, of course, has a downside: the landlord might confuse her
responsibilities to care with her need to invade her tenants' legitimate
autonomy. But the converse decision also has a strong downside: to discount
such landlords' interests as merely economic is to send the wrong message
about the kind of local communities we may hope to have. That is, it may
signal that we do not want landlords who are interested in their tenants' needs
or their tenants' misbehavior, that we want landlords who are indifferent to
who their tenants are as persons, whose choices will be based solely on
economics. 38 To discount Mrs. Smith as merely a commercial enterprise is
to move farther along to the day when the engaged landlord disappears, and
our only landlords will be large corporations with absentee managers who
govern through rules rather than relationships, who ignore disruptive tenants
and habitability issues until it hurts their bottom line. The blessing of
anonymity is also its curse: the landlord who may murmur disapproval at an
indigent woman's poor choice in relationships is also the landlord who may
fix the heat faster because she knows the woman's children.
A second way in which Mrs. Smith may be discounted is to equate her
religious beliefs with matters of private taste, following the modem
assumption that religious matters are irrational, unprovable and therefore
merely subjective.39 Such a move discounts the community character of
most religious convictions-the religiously motivated Mrs. Smith is likely to
be turning down an unmarried couple as she lives out her commitments to a
religious community and to a divine Other as she understands them, rather
than simply echoing an instinctive reaction to a tenant she does not
understand or approve. In this way, her response may be quite different from
a non-religious landlord, whose refusal may be echoed by disgust at what he
perceives to be an unnatural relationship, or a lifestyle different from his
37 For example, the dissent in Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm 'n makes much
of the fact that Mrs. Smith was not a passive investor but actively managed her rental property,
including personal attention to the process of selecting tenants. Smith, 913 P.2d 947 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
38 See generally William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBYSyndrome:
A Comment on Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhoot4 "7 GEo. MASON L. REv. 881
(1999) (discussing why landlords do not tend to object to further development in their
neighborhoods as much as owners who occupy their real estate).
39 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DSBELmF: HOW AMEiCANLAW AND POLrcis
TRIvALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 22 (1993); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURIsPRUDENCE 12-13 (1995).
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own. Indeed, the religious landlord may well struggle within her conscience,
caught between teachings of her community which demand that she both
"hate the sin" and "love the sinner." 40
To insist that Mrs. Smith keep her religious convictions entirely in the
closet by outlawing them as a basis for reflection about whom she should
choose as a tenant not only demeans her commitments and her internal
struggles. It sends the message that people of religious and moral
convictions should keep them quiet, not prophetically criticizing the evils
they witness in society, whether individual or corporate. Moreover, to
privatize her religious convictions may well reinforce her instinct that she is
the victim at the hands of the state, that rights protecting her basic dignity are
being stripped away for a trivial or even evil purpose. Disregarding Mrs.
Smith's convictions may reinforce the instinct of her religious community
that it is now the persecuted minority, pushing that community to react
aggressively toward other minorities, to unreasonably magnify those
minorities' new "power" in the larger community and to strike out, even
violently. This is at least one reading of the vengeful violence that met
blacks in places such as Little Rock, when whites, forced to give up their
privilege, imagined blacks' power as larger than life, recreated themselves as
victims and retaliated, claiming to be avenging justice rather than protecting
ill-gotten privilege.
42
Conversely, the harms that gay and lesbian couples suffer when Mrs.
Smith denies them housing because of their relationship or sexual orientation
are similarly not de minimis, and should not be treated as such. The
economic impact of permitting small landlords to discriminate against gay
and lesbian couples due to their religious beliefs has not been well
documented.43 Yet, any legal regime that purports to seriously consider the
40 Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DETRoIT MERCY L. REv. 189,
196-99, 201-06 (1999) (describing the conflict within churches and among religious people
about homosexuality, gay marriage, and the ordination of gay people); Jeffrey L. Sheler et al.,
Faced with Declining Membership, Churches Are Struggling to Reconcile the Bible with the
Permissive Attitudes of Many Parishioners, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 10, 1991, at
5861, 6364, available at 1991 WL 9885717 (describing church conflicts over sexual issues,
including homosexuality).
41 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 20, at 174-75.
42 See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CurrDG EDGE 551-60 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 1995) (describing how the concept of
the innocent victim in affirmative action cases continues to perpetuate racism).
43 Compare Maureen Markey, The Price of Landford's "Free" Exercise of Religion:
Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699,
740-41 (1995) (suggesting that the large increase in unmarried couples makes the problem of
marital status discrimination more urgent) and Keirsten G. Anderson, Note, Protecting
(continued)
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predicament of both parties cannot afford to assume it is either minimal or
crushing any more than it can assume that Mrs. Smith can easily exit the
housing market. In some housing markets-particularly in rural areas with
few apartments or in expanding urban cores where housing is not being built
as fast as jobs are becoming available--the impact of widespread
discrimination by small landlords on the availability of housing may be
substantial. 44 Indeed, perhaps one of the most compelling legislative
arguments for the Fair Housing Act was that morally brave landlords who
tried to rent to both blacks and whites were being ostracized or economically
harmed by their communities for doing the right thing.45 While communities
are not as closeknit as they were in 1968, landlords in some small,
homogenous communities may well fear that renting to gays and lesbians
will cost them socially and economically.46 Conversely, in other markets,
small landlord-owned housing may be dwarfed in both availability and
affordability by corporate complexes that have little religious reason to
discriminate. 47 Local governmental efforts to get at real economic disparities
Unmarried Cohabitants from the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
1017, 1018 n. 10 (1997) (suggesting widespread discrimination against unmarried couples
based on marital status complaints in California) with Michael V. Hernandez, The Right of
Religious Landlords to Exclude Unmarried Co-Habitants: Debunking the Myth of Tenant's
"New Clothes, " 77 NEB. L. REV. 494, 517 (1998) (claiming "there is currently no credible
evidence that unmarried couples face such unfavorable conditions in the rental market that the
state may protect them."). See also Sheldon S. Shafer, Jefferson Expected to OK Bill on Gays;
Vote Tomorrow Likely to Grant Wide Protections, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, LOUISVILLE, KY,
Sept. 27, 1999, at 01A, available at 1999 WL 5670374 (discussing discrimination complaints
by gays and lesbians in Jefferson County).
44 See generally Craig A. Arnold, Ignoring the Rural Underclass: The Biases of
Federal Housing Policy 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193-94 (1990) (describing severe
racial discrimination in rural housing).
45 114 CONG. REc. S2985 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire, noting
that "in real life, it is quite costly-in dollars and cents--to be a reformer" and that "[n]o single
developer or landlord can afford to undertake reform alone.").
46 See generally Shades of Gay: With AIDS No Longer an All-Consuming Crisis, the
Battle for Tolerance has Moved to Schools, Churches, Offices and the Frontiers ofFamily Life,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46 (describing mixed tolerance and discrimination against gays
and lesbians); Jospeh P. Shapiro, Kids with Gay Parents as Lawmakers Battle Gay Marriages,
a Look at How the Children Fare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REvr., Sept. 16, 1996, at 7576, 7879,
available at 1996 WL 7811465 (describing taunts by classmates of children with lesbian or
gay parents).
47 Corporations are more likely to be governed by a diverse board of directors who will
have a variety of religious and moral perspectives on issues such as gay and lesbian couples
and privacy. They are also less likely to be actually aware of a possible conflict between their
religious beliefs and their economic interests since it is less likely that the unmarried status of a
(continued)
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existing in various housing markets through devices such as rent control, re-
zoning, and even housing discrimination laws have demonstrated that context
does make a difference in the nature of the harm being pressed. 48
Moreover, much as Mrs. Smith's decision to enter the rental market may
be, in part, a commitment to the kind of community she wants to live in, so
too the couple's decision to rent a unit in a traditional neighborhood may
evidence a commitment to forging a certain kind of local community, the
kind which can only emerge when strangers come to know each other over
time and over fences or coffee. The choice of a residence, like the choice of
a partner, is not appropriately equated to the choice of one's automobile or
other material goods. Even the choice of a short-term apartment may reflect
deep human needs for a place of one's own, for security, for self-expression
and care, and for creating a nurturing environment for one's family.49
Indeed, it may express one's personal need for attachment to community: the
commitment to reach out and look out for those strangers whom geographical
proximity has thrown together. Property law has traditionally recognized the
non-fuingibility of real property, particularly of a place one intends to make
his or her home.50 While the interest of a couple who are simply looking at a
possible home is not easily comparable to a family who has a history of
couple may come to their attention. Moreover, even if the governing board was religiously
homogeneous, the likelihood that they would feel the same moral responsibility for their
corporate decision as they might for a personal decision to rent to a morally objectionable
tenant is diminished. Finally, a corporate landlord is more likely to hold economic
considerations in stronger regard than non-economic criteria regulating the choice of clients,
since individual discriminatory decisions not met by reciprocal discrimination by other housing
providers are against the economic interests of the discriminating party because they restrict
the pool of economically trustworthy tenants. Conversely, however, corporate landlords can
have a much more decisive impact on disadvantaged groups, not only because of the number of
current and future units they control, but because their practices may be copied by smaller
landlords who cannot invest the resources to determine what rental practices are legal or serve
their best economic interests.
48 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
699, 763-64 (1993).
49 See Bond, supra note 5, at 317, noting the uniqueness of housing as a commodity
(quoting David W. Bartelt, Housing the "Underclass, " in THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE: VIEwS
FROM HISTORY 110, 119-20 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (arguing that some property such as a wedding
ring has personhood value because it symbolizes the intimate relationship between two people
and reminds one how she is enriched by the relationship).
50 See Radin, supra note 49, at 597 (arguing that "to achieve proper self-development-
to be a person--an individual needs some control over resources in the external
environment.").
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experiences and a sense of security about their residence, feelings of
attachment often arise naturally and quickly when someone has found his or
her "perfect" place.
At the same time, context is equally important in understanding the limits
of harm to the prospective tenant's interest in shelter. To equate the harm in
the denial of a stranger's apartment with, for instance, the violation of one's
physical person or even one's opportunity to work-indeed, to treat as equal
all dignitary and practical harms that persons suffer because of their race or
sexual preference-similarly seems to belie human experience.
More importantly, particularly for gay or lesbian couples, rejection by a
landlord because of his disapproval of their most intimate relationship
confers a stigmatic harm, which is not easily expressible or quantifiable.
While the fear and shame that gay and lesbian couples experience from a
stranger's disapproval may not be as traumatic as a parent's disgust that his
child is gay or lesbian, like the experience of a person who is repeatedly
shamed because of his race, the sheer number and combined weight of each
small sting may push him or her to the emotional breaking point. 51 And a
shaming experience where one is most vulnerable-in her relationships with
family and friends, work or home-may be particularly difficult due to the
accompanying anxiety about the security of the future. If one landlord can
turn a person down because he is gay, he has no way of knowing that the next
landlord will see things differently, or the next, and that ultimately he will
find a decent place to live.
In such cases of intimate association, where an individual's very selfhood
is partially constituted in relationship--where people may experience the best
of who they are with another--a landlady's rejection of the relationship may
well be even more harmful than her rejection of the individual based on his or
her sexual orientation. Indeed, the harm exacerbated by rejection of the
relationship may be particularly acute precisely because one's partner is also
shamed. Even gays or lesbians who have learned to deflect shame leveled
against themselves may be victimized by having to experience their beloved
partner's pain, and the feeling that they are powerless to remove that pain.
Finally, for Mrs. Smith-or for the law-to reject a gay or lesbian couple's
commitment as sinful or odious is as much a sign of disrespect for her
potential tenants' conscience as her tenants' insistence on forcing her to rent
to them is disrespectful of her conscience.
It is the tragedy of a rights versus rights conflict that when rights are
definitively assigned through a liability rule, rights are also taken away.
51 See, e.g., Patrick J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon Toxicity of
the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 731, 775 (1996) (suggesting that black people may suffer from serious psychiatric
problems as a result of racism, citing JOER. FEAGun& MELvIDP. SwcES, LIVING WrrHRACIsM:
THE BLAcK MIDDLE-CLASS ExPsmNcE 15-18 (1994)).
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Unlike other cases in which the parties may have had no legitimate reliance
that the state would protect them, when the state prefers the recognized
human rights of one person over those of another, the state has
simultaneously withdrawn the cloak of protection that in other cases the
individual has come to rely on. In this case, both Mrs. Smith and the
prospective tenant might have had reasonable expectations that the law would
vindicate their conscience and equality rights over other economic and social
interests; but when placed head to head, Mrs. Smith's conscience rights
cannot be vindicated without stripping her tenants of their equality rights.
The losing party experiences not only the losses that come with traditional
imposition of duties, but the loss of the state's protection. Indeed, in a
political culture that highly prizes civil rights and casts those who violate
such rights into a deep moral and political hell, to tell Mrs. Smith or her
prospective tenants that they are violating the other's rights is to morally
condemn them as well.52
For lawmakers to acknowledge the complex and significant harms
potentially faced by both parties in this conflict is not to require that they shut
their eyes to more disheartening possibilities about both parties in the
conflict, a concern I will address later. It is true that Mrs. Smith may not be
such a nice religious woman, struggling with her conscience to make the right
decision. She may simply be a mean-spirited, bigoted, selfish woman, who
simply wants to exercise her property power to revictimize tenants who
belong to vulnerable groups, to shame them as persons because they disgust
her or fail to conform to her rigid personal view of the world. Conversely,
her prospective tenants may not be a committed couple conscientiously trying
to live out a virtuous life in the face of legal obstacles to traditional
commitment. They may be self-involved individuals living together because
it suits their immediate self-interest. The only reason for such tenants to
batter Mrs. Smith with the civil rights law may be that they do not want
anyone pointing out their moral vacuity, or that they are morally childish,
unused to taking "no" for an answer. Moreover, even if Mrs. Smith or her
tenant is well-meaning, their benign motives may not meaningfully assuage
the damage that the other experiences when his rights and interests are legally
extinguished, a damage which may affect the public as a whole as well as
these individual litigants.
Neither the virtues nor the vices of a Mrs. Smith or the Joneses can be
distinguished in a simple legal or constitutional rule that abstractly prefers the
rights of one to the other. Onlythe thick description that fact-finding affords
can even come close to describing the harms and judging the "sincerity" of
either party. A civil rights law can respond to a summary of many people's
52 See Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237-38 (Mass. 1994) (suggesting that a
claim that religious landlords are discriminating may stigmatize them); see also Knutson, supra
note 12, at 1698 (describing Desilets).
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experiences by suggesting that one party is more likely to be vulnerable to
the harm occasioned by private persons or the state and will therefore need
rights, but a rule cannot account for those cases that defy the generality,
where the tables are turned. Only an encounter between the parties in the
presence of a mediator, arbitrator or judge/jury is likely to expose and
distinguish invidious and conscientious, harmful and harmless action.
It is also true that no legal remedy may assuage the real damage to either
dignitary, or the more tangible, harms that either person experiences in this
case. But to say that the law cannot make someone whole is not to say that
the law must trivialize the harms it seeks to acknowledge.
Indeed, a useful purpose of legal process, one that is most explicitly
recognized in mediation, is to allow people to express the pain they feel to
those who have harmed them, even when that harm cannot be fully erased. 53
Particularly when a legal conflict involves dignitary concerns that so closely
touch the individual and so clearly express social values, the expression of
harm must be an important part of the process. 54
B. Error Two: Resorting to Positivism
A second false start in resolving Smith v. Jones is the resort to
positivism, in this case, to an abstract resolution of the conflict between
statutory and constitutional law. One move is a simple syllogism:
1. Constitutions trump statutes55 (or federal law trumps state law).56
2. Religious freedom is a constitutional (federal) right57 while the right
to nondiscrimination on the basis of marital status or homosexual
orientation is a statutory (state) right.
3. Therefore, Mrs. Smith's constitutional free exercise right trumps the
Joneses' statutory right to nondiscrimination.
Second, courts may attempt to resolve the dispute by application of the
Sherbert rule, 58 either as a proposed interpretation of a particular state
53 See Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of
Peacemaking, 14 MEDIATION Q. 201,202-04 (1997).
54 Id. at 203 (describing the "genuine empowerment and mutual recognition of each
party's humanity in addition to the value of compassionate strength among parties in conflict
that arises from humanistic or transformative mediation" and the ability for parties to "expand
their perspective... to include an appreciation for the circumstances that the other person is
faced with").
55 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 801-03 (Souter, J. dissenting).
56 See, e.g., Cooperv. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1958).
5" See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
58 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
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constitution59 or, pre-Boerne, as an application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.60 This more complicated analysis6' proposes:
1. Mrs. Smith has a sincere religious freedom claim62 and
either:
a. she does not suffer a substantial burden-hence, she suffers no
constitutional harm and the Joneses win. (Here, the most
frequent reason given for finding that she is not burdened is that
she is not forced to be in the housing market, or has a free choice
between being a landlord under terms that violate her conscience
or going into another line of work).
63
b. she does suffer a substantial burden. (Here, courts and
commentators have argued that forcing Mrs. Smith to choose
between her religious conscience and her rights to utilize her
property is an unacceptable choice).
64
3. If Mrs. Smith does suffer a substantial burden, then either:
59 See, e.g., Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Swarmer v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska).
60 Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 921-24 (Cal. 1996).
RFRA was also raised in the lower court prior to City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm 'n, 165 F.3d 692,697 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), on reh'g, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), available
at 2000 WL 1069977. (The opinion in Thomas was withdrawn on the basis that the case was
not yet ripe, since the landlords had not denied any specific proposed tenants the right to
housing after passage of the state law.) The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in order to restore statutorily the Sherbert
compelling state interest test in religious freedom cases, but was held unconstitutional in City
ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515.
61 See, e.g., Smith vs. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 921-29.
62 The Swanner court, for example, held that the landlord must show that religion is
involved, that the conduct in question is religiously based, and that the claimant is sincere in
his or her religious belief. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281,
63 Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283; Smith, 913 P.2d at 95 ; McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d
723, 729 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 592 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999); see Markey, supra
note 43, at 814-81 (suggesting the difficulties of permitting a religious exemption for
commercial businesses).
6 See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 712-14; Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,238 (Mass.
1994); Hernandez, supra note 43, at 552. See also Clegg, supra note 4, at 1610-11 (arguing
that discrimination based on familial status or marital status does not pose the same social
harm, requiring a federal response, as race discrimination).
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a. the state has no compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
on the basis of marital status, therefore Mrs. Smith wins. (Here,
courts have found that the state's interest in marital status
discrimination, while important, does not rise to the compelling
level of eradicating gender or racial discrimination, because
marital status discrimination is much less invidious, because it is
not based on status but conduct within the victim's control and
thus is much less harmful to the individual and society),65 or
b. the state has a compelling interest in eradicating such forms of
discrimination as the Joneses have experienced. (Here, courts
have suggested that they should defer to legislative
determinations that marital status discrimination is on a par with
other compelling anti- discrimination interests, as can be implied
from its inclusion in the state nondiscrimination statute).
6f
4. If the state has a compelling interest, then either:
a. the state has used the alternative which is least restrictive of Mrs.
Smith's religious freedom, the Joneses' win and Mrs. Smith
must provide them housing or pay damages;67 or
b. the state has not used the least restrictive alternative,68 so Mrs.
Smith wins.
65 See, e.g., Thomas, 165 F.3d at 714-17 (noting that there has been no'Tirm" national
policy against marital discrimination and that "not all discrimination is created equal");
Markey, supra note 43, at 788-801 (discussing the nature of the harms to the state and
individual of marital status discrimination). See also Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281 (noting that no
exemption would be given if it would pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace and order
or there were a compelling state interest of the highest order); Rebecca Wistner, Note,
Cohabitation, Fornication and the Free Exercise of Religion: Landlords Seeking Religious
Exemption from Fair Housing Laws, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1071, 1103 (1996) (discussing
compelling interests in tenants' privacy and intimate association, in providing tenants with
housing, and regulating secular commercial activity).
66 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d at 915-18
(deferring to administrative commission and to plain meaning and legislative intent); Foreman
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1201-02 (Alaska 1989) (noting the clear
legislative intent to cover unmarried couples); McCready, 586 N.W.2d at 725 (noting clear
legislative intent to protect couples by including marital status in statute).
67 Anderson, supra note 43, at 1064-65.
68 Wistner, supra note 65, at 1110-11 (arguing that refusal to allow a religious
exemption from the fair housing act may or may not be the least restrictive means, depending
on the state interest which is most important).
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The major positivist difficulty with this form of legal argument is that
both the Joneses' statutory claim and Mrs. Smith's religious freedom claim
rest on very fragile positivist grounds at the moment. The Joneses' right to
non-discrimination is still emerging in state laws. 69 Numerous states do not
explicitly recognize sexual orientation to be a prohibited basis for
discrimination. In some states, majorities have vigorously opposed such
recognition in broad-reaching legislation such as Colorado's Amendment
Two 70 as well as more narrowly focused statutes such as little-DOMA acts. 71
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recognition that individuals have the
right not to be treated invidiously because of homosexual status is lukewarm
at best. The Romer Court applied only rational basis scrutiny to a wide-
ranging constitutional amendment that the Court found was hard to read as
anything but an invidious attempt to strip basic rights of citizenship from gay
and lesbian people based solely on their sexual orientation. 72 Its clarity and
"sheer breadth"73 were an easy target for the principle that government must
at least govern impartially. 74 The baggage-of other federal constitutional
cases involving gay and lesbian people remains. Bowers v. Hardwick 75 for
example, cuts directly into the Joneses' claim that they have a constitutional
right to be respected as a couple on the same basis as heterosexuals.
69 See, e.g., County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Wis. 1993) (local
ordinance). According to Battaglia, supra note 40, at 224, only ten states and the District of
Columbia protect against sexual orientation discrimination by nongovernmental persons, and
only nine of these protect against housing and economic discrimination.
70 Colorado's Amendment Two, which provided that no state or local governmental
unit may "enact, adopt, enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis to entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preference, protected status or claim of discrimination," CoLO. CoNsT. art. II, §
30(b), was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
71 A number of states have followed the lead of Congress in passing the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (which permits states to deny full faith and
credit to other states' recognized marriages between persons of the same sex, and defines
marriage for purpose of federal benefits as a relationship between two persons of opposite
sexes). See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 25-101(c) (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (b)
(Harrison 2000); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 subd. 1 (a)(4)
(West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (1) (West 2000).
72 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.
73 Id
"4 Id at 633; Battaglia, supra note 40, at 234-35.
75 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (holding that the state may prohibit consensual sodomy
between two people of the same sex, while reserving the question whether the state might
apply the sodomy statute to married couples or others).
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While marital status nondiscrimination laws have quietly but steadily
been increasing, the Joneses' right not to be discriminated against based on
their marital status is not very strong right now. Only a large handful of
states protect people against "marital status" discrimination. 76 In only a few
of them have courts held that "marital status" includes discrimination against
the marital status of the couple, rather than .of an individual tenant.77
Moreover, the reported cases have mostly involved heterosexual couples;
78
and it is unclear whether the state courts will extend their reach to gay and
lesbian couples, given the Supreme Court's crabbed reading of the right to
privacy for homosexuals in Bowers. Some state courts have interpreted their
statutes as lacking evidence that legislatures meant to protect unmarried
couples under the marital status provisions. The Minnesota courts, for
instance, decided that the legislature could not have meant to protect a
relationship which is criminalized under the state's existing fornication
statute. 79 Yet in other states, legislatures and courts have specifically
76 McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1998), vacated in part, 593 N.W.2d
545 (Mich. 1999) (citing Michigan statute MCL 37.2502(1)(a), MSA 3.548 (502)(1)(a)).
Although forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have fair housing laws, only twenty-
one states and the district of Columbia prohibited marital status discrimination as of 1995,
according to Prof. Markey, who also argues that in only three of those states (California,
Massachusetts, and Alaska) is it clear that marital status discrimination includes unmarried
couples. Markey, supra note 43, at 753-55. Hemandez, supra note 43, at 502, claims that
only seventeen states have marital status provisions for housing, and none explicitly protects
unmarried couples.
77 Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381-82 (1976); Att'y
Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,235 (Mass. 1994) (remanded to determine whether state had
a compelling interest in overriding religious objections of landlord); Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 33 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted and
superseded by Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
review dismissed and cause remanded by Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n,
859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199,
1201-02 (Alaska 1989); see also discussion in Markey, supra note 43, at 755-70.
79 See, e.g., McFadden v. Elman Country Club, 613 P.2d 146,150-51 (Wash. App. Div.
1980); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 727-29 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 593
N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d 754, 756-
58 (N.J. 1973). Of course, most of the cases do not indicate whether cohabitating friends of
the same sex are involved in romantic relationships or not.
79 Compare Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2,10 (1990); McFadden v. Elman Country
Club, 613 P.2d 146,150-51 (1980) (a "person" must mean one person, not a relationship); and
County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 683, 689-90 (Wis. 1993) (finding that a policy of
encouraging marriage militates against the construction of marital status to include unmarried
relationships); with McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 727-29 (Mich. 1998), vacated in
(continued)
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exempted Mrs. Smith from having to comply with "marital status"
discrimination prohibitions because of privacy.8
0
However, Mrs. Smith fares little better as a matter of positive law. The
Supreme Court's current reading of the Free Exercise Clause, in Employment
Division v. Smith,81 permits a state to enforce a neutral, generally applicable
law such as the marital status nondiscrimination statute even when it
substantially burdens the religious rights of Mrs. Smith and forces her to
violate her conscience. 82 Thus, absent more successful federal legislation
replacing RFRA,8 3 unless Mrs. Smith lives in a state where the courts follow
the Sherbert interpretation84 of its own state constitution, she will have no
cause for complaint against legislation protecting unmarried couples through
"marital status" or sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws. The Supreme
Court's holding in Smith says she has no Free Exercise right, and therefore no
constitutional (federal) right, to trump the Joneses' statutory (state) rights in
the original syllogism. 85
part, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d
1199, 1202 (Alaska 1989).
80 See state statutes cited in Battaglia, supra note 40, at 229-30 n.184-86 and
accompanying text (noting that several housing discrimination laws exclude boarder or
roommate arrangements, or owner-occupied dwellings with a small number of units, and some
have different rules for sexual orientation discrimination than for other forms of
discrimination).
81 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
82 See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 279-80
(Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 (1994) (holding that because the fair housing law
was neutral and generally applicable, its enforcement did not violate Swanner's federal free
exercise rights); McCready, 586 N.W.2d at 728-29 (no violation of general applicability
requirement of Smith because the statute gave exemptions on non-religious bases).
83 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as it applies to invalidate state
statutes, at least, was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511
(1997).
94 A number of states have employed the pre-Smith Free Exercise test in interpreting
their own state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W. 2d 393,398-99 (1990).
This test requires the constitutional courts to determine whether government has a compelling
state interest to outweigh the substantial burden its statute imposes on a claimant's sincere
exercise of her religion, and that it has chosen a narrowly tailored means to effectuate its
interest. See, e.g., McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723,729 (Mich. 1998). vacated in part
593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 32, 39-41 (1991), review granted and superseded by Donahue v. FairEmployment & Hous.
Comm'n, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded by Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
85 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The positivist approach does have some possible virtue in this case,
though it is not the one that might be assumed. The oft-stated value of
positive law in settling rights determinations is that it is relatively clear and
easy to apply, and therefore provides fair notice to people about their legal
duties and rights.86 Moreover, it precludes the need for courts to re-think the
question of which right is more important to the electorate or the civilization,
since the legislature (or constitution) has settled that question. Thus, the
positivist approach seems to obviate the need to ask the perennial
jurisdictional question: should courts have the right to interpret law according
to some moral universe not embodied in the plain letter of the law, whether it
is their own moral universe, the electorate's, some American moral tradition,
or some universal law?87
Jones v. Smith immediately undercuts positivism's premise of simplicity
and clarity. On the Jones side of the "v," the courts must interpret the law
using someone's values: they must determine whether "marital status" was
meant to cover unmarried couples (particularly gay and lesbian unmarried
couples) with usually little guidance from state legislatures on that point.
88
On the Smith side, assuming that Smith is arguing from her state constitution
and not a specific statutory exemption, the courts must minimally decide
what "substantial burden," "compelling interest" and "least restrictive
alternative" should mean, 89 assuming that they simply take Mrs. Smith's
sincerity for granted. 90 Thus, they must still cull the history, prioritize and
refine defimitions of the values that are at the core of constitutional and
statutory religious freedom protections. In this case, the positivist approach
86 See JOHN NOWACK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CoNsimmoNAL LAW (5th ed. 1995)
87 In this particular context, see Hemandez, supra note 43, at 565-66 (arguing that a
minority ofjudicial activists and commentators"believe here is nothing wrong with fornication
and unmarried cohabitation and they want the state to punish those who sincerely disagree with
them").
88 See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,36-37
(1991), review granted and superseded by Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded by Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (noting that the legislative actions
prior to statutory adoption "are not particularly helpful in attempting to ascertain legislative
intent").
89 See. e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692,711-17 (9th
Cir. 1999), reh. granted, opinion withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), on reh 'g 220
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), available at 2000 WL 1069977; Scott A. Johnson, Note, The
Conflict Between Religious Exercise and Efforts to Eradicate Housing Discrimination Against
Nontraditional Couples: Should Free Exercise Protect Landlord Bias? 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 351,365-93 (1996).
90 See Johnson, supra note 89, at 367 (noting that the sincerely held religious belief of
landlords has not been challenged in any case).
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largely fails to avoid the problem ofjudicial competence and jurisdiction to
decide the hard questions that the morality of civil rights disputes.
The Swiss cheese that Smith v. Jones makes of positivism, however,
turns out to be something of a virtue. What the left hand taketh away in
terms of clarity, notice, and easy application, the right hand giveth in the
possibility for a dialogical resolution of Smith v. Jones. The lack of clarity
about the priority of civil rights puts both Mrs. Smith and the Joneses on
notice that their contemporary community and their traditional polity may
well disagree with their individual beliefs that their rights are absolute and
autonomous, not dependent on consideration of the rights of their neighbor.
Since they cannot be certain about their own rights, they cannot, in the
community's presence and with its blessing, make a triumphalist claim that
they are by clear consensus on the side of the angels and their opponent has
sold out to the devil. (Of course, one human response to legal uncertainty is
to be even more defensive about the rightfulness of one's claim; the
vagueness of each person's rights may cause him or her to all the more
stubbornly insist on them as a defense mechanism.) Moreover, these rights
are put on the table for private discussions about the possibility that either
Mrs. Smith or the Joneses might be wrong in insisting on their rights. They
are put on the public table for a more extensive discussion about whose
concerns are most compelling, which may possibly impel a public response
that addresses both concerns in a more creative way than the rights versus
rights battle can produce.
C. Discounting Rights
A third, related false start in, the Smith v. Jones conflict is to
mischaracterize or discount the fundamentality of the rights which one side
or the other asserts, or in other words, to throw up one's hands and say,
"incommensurable, can't be measured against each other, so the only neutral
value is 'choice."' 9 1 In this move, religious freedom is, for some, really not
that important when the equality principle conflicts with it; or conversely, an
individual's experience of unequal treatment (even if unjust) is hardly the
equivalent of forcing someone to act against her conscience. 92 Although the
instinct to compare rights in this fashion bespeaks a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute instead of side-stepping it, like the move to compare
harms, the rights-comparative move will be false unless it compares rights
more thickly, more concretely, and in a more complex way than most court
cases or law review articles do. Indeed, the rights comparison also has to
resist the attempt to stay with stereotyped rights categories, exploring the
91 See, e.g., GEDICKS, supra note 39, at 13.
9 Cf Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693,
724-25 (1997) (describing Eisgruber and Sager's work that suggests that the value of equal
treatment means that the government must act in a secular manner).
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factual territory and being prepared to recognize when rights are of the same
kind, which may well be true in this dispute.
Strategically, from either a traditional liberal or progressive perspective,
the move to compare two rights against each other on an abstract basis can
bring no good to individuals and polities who care about human rights as an
important line of defense against the power of bureaucracies, state or private.
To denigrate or make light of one of these rights, such as the
nondiscrimination right or the right of religious conscience, may have the
short-term appeal of resolving the immediate controversy. However, the
long-term impact of such a strategy is to suggest that fundamental rights are
not sacred, even in the secular sense of the word in which they inhere in a
person simply because of his humanity and cannot be alienated.
93 If
fundamental rights are treated as equivalent to one's personal interest in the
stock market or sitting on a beautiful beach sipping daiquiris, it is quite easy
for courts whose sensibilities have been deadened to their critical necessity in
bleak times of government despotism to simply let them slide in times of less
obviously wrongful government actions. Thus, for example, the indifference
of government to the plight of the needy which expresses itself in summary
action to terminate their means to buy food and shelter 94 may seem not so
* awful to a court that has conceded that the right to be heard is a nice right, but
not a fundamental human concern given the state's immediate budget crisis.
The false starts of discounting the importance of basic human rights, or
confusing human desires with rights, or even giving up in the name of
"incommensurability" are easy false starts in a legal system shaped by largely
by modernity. The modem understanding of truth, and thus of right, is based
on what we might think of as the scientismic model of truth. In the
scientismic model, truth is based on some verifiable reality.95 In a pure
scientismic model, truth can be neither contradictory or uncertain, so that if
two assertions about reality appear to conflict, one must be false and the other
true, or both false.96 As Bertrand Russell would argue, if one cannot
93 Compare MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RiGrs: FouR INQUmiES 13,25,29,
35 (1998) with Natan Lerner, A Secular View of Human Rights, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 67-89
(1999-2000).
94 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the state may not terminate
welfare benefits in a summary manner even for financial reasons).
95 See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. L.J. 453, 458 (1996).
96 GEDICKS, supra note 39, at 31; see also GARY MINDA: POSMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ATCENTURY'S END 13-15,20,22 (1995) (describing
Langdell's "faith in the powers of science and reason to uncover universal truths and law as a
system that satisfied the legal norms of objectivity and consistency" in opposition to modem
theories that utilize a "set of conflicting and paradoxical abstract propositions" about reality).
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certainly prove the truth of an assertion, one is impelled to doubt it.97 In the
modem legal system, this has come to mean that conflicting rights cannot co-
exist in the same time and space, because they express a conflict about the
"truth" of the human condition, and "truth" cannot possibly be self-
contradictory or paradoxical.
This "scientismic" understanding of truth as a key ingredient in the
recognition of human rights may lead in several different directions. First,
one might claim that these human "rights" are not both rights; one is really a
right, and the other simply an interest, a matter of personal preference. 98 As I
have suggested, in the landlord-tenant dispute, this is indeed the tenor of the
conversation-landlords only have an economic interest, or tenants only have
a social interest in this particular apartment. Second, rights arguments may
assume that there is some "scientific" way to compare rights-that there is,
like a periodic table of elements or an economic analysis, some way to assign
weight to rights, to put the right to equality "higher" or assign it more
"points" than the right to association or religious freedom, or vice-versa.
Some attempts to describe religious freedom as a "first" freedom 99 stem from
this "scientismic" perspective on truth and rights. First in time, first in right
becomes a legitimately "objective" way to assign value priority, one that will
set the proper place of a right in the list. Similarly, attempts to prioritize
rights try to quantify how many people are affected by the right on one side
or another, often under the disguise of a moral argument for democracy. 100
For example, the argument that banning school officials from sponsoring
prayer in the public schools violates the rights of the majority and is thus
unconstitutional 10 1 may be just such an attempt to quantify rights. Ironically,
utilitarian or law and economics attempts to take this concept seriously and
put it out on the table by assigning economic value to rights 0 2 are
97 See WAYNE C. BOOTH: MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF AssENT 55-62
(1974).
98 Compare, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 43, at 499 (arguing that landlords have a right
and that the right of unmarried cohabitants is "as illusory as the emperor's new clothes") with
Markey, supra note 43, at 817 (suggesting that exceptions for religious business owners would
permit business "to cloak discrimination in the shroud of free exercise of religion").
99 Not all uses of this term, however, make this value assumption. As just one example,
James Wood, who has often used this term, has made more foundational arguments for its
priority. See generally, James E. Wood, Jr., The Relationship of Religious Liberty to Civil
Liberty anda Democratic State, 1998 BYU L. REv. 479.
100 But see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,
2144-53 (1990) (objecting to the idea that consequentialism does justice to democratic values).
101 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
102 See MINDA, supra note 96, at 98-99.
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considered amusing or impractical, 103 even though such approaches take
these scientismic notions of truth and rights to their logical conclusion.
Finally, in what has become almost postmodern boilerplate, one might
conclude that if courts cannot establish one right to be true or more valuable
than another with any certainty, law's only hope is to announce that rights are
"incommensurable." 10 4 In one version of this argument, both asserted
"rights" must merely be a matter of the contestants' personal preference or a
personal taste which has little to say about critical common issues of human
existence and meaning. 105 In another, both asserted rights are so profound,
and so profoundly disturbed in a concrete human conflict, that there is no
possible way to bring them down to size sufficiently enough to resolve a
dispute without permanent damage to value itself: equality writ large is
always at stake in a discrimination case; conscience in a religious freedom
case. 106 In a system in which rights cannot logically conflict because truth
cannot logically be multiple, the state may vindicate both claims only by
resorting to positivism or the minimalist state. That is, law can only ask
whether a choice of rights was passed through the proper process (mostly
majoritarian) 107 or must prefer the "neutral principle" of human autonomy,
which protects individual rights not on their own merits but as expressions of
singular human preferences and desires, insisting that the state stay out of
regulation unless it can come forward with a "scientific" reason for doing
so.108
In one sense, the religious landlord/gay tenant debate has largely been
played out on this constitutional battlefield of human autonomy. On the
tenant's side, those who would demand that Mrs. Smith admit unmarried
tenants or be held in violation of the state's human rights laws argue that
Mrs. Smith's refusal invades their right to choose their sexual partners and
practices, to choose the person to whom they want to be intimately related,
103 Id. at 213-14 (discussion of Owen Fiss' view that law and economics claims were
based on "crude instrumentalism" that would lead to the "relativization of all values").
104 See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215,
1216 & n.3 (1998) (noting that often the metric assumed is monetary, but that it need not be;
arguing that the fact that values are incommensurable (e.g., not reducible to a common metric)
does not mean that they are incomparable (e.g., that they cannot be viewed as better or worse
than each other)).
105 See, e. g., GEDICKS, supra note 39, at 12, 32, 110-11, 109-12; MINDA, supra note
96, at 88-89, 94, 241 (description of law and economics movement).
106 But see Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and its Constitutional Consequences,
45 HASTINGs L. J. 785, 792-93, 802 (1994) (arguing that even if one ideally believed in rights
incommensurability, one might want to operate as if rights were commensurable because it
would make solutions possible rather than encouraging people to give up on social problems).
107 See MlNDA, supra note 96, at 96 (discussing the interest group pluralism theory).
108 See id at 37-43 (discussing the neutral principle theory).
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and to choose a home where they can live this chosen lifestyle. 109 On the
autonomy battlefield, gay and lesbian partners are indistinguishable from
heterosexual partners on this score, for the rights of intimate association are
premised on the notion that the state has no right to dictate action or choices
of intimacy to any person.1 10 Although some would argue that the harm of
denied rights falls more heavily on gay and lesbian partners than on
heterosexuals since gay and lesbian partners cannot choose to avoid the harm
by marrying, others would argue that any preference for the intimate choices
of gay and lesbian partners over straight couples would be based upon a
moral judgment that the state is not entitled to make about intimate
associations. I I I In part, that is because in judging whether, for example,
marital intercourse is morally superior to casual intercourse, a pluralistic state
cannot construct a principle for judging that can be indubitably proven and
therefore (in the modem model) serve as a basis to coerce or even evaluate
human behavior. 112
On the battlefield of autonomy, the religious landlord's claims would
similarly not be open to scrutiny to determine either their sincerity or their
validity, for one person's freedom of (religious) choice is to him just as
precious as another's. 113 Not only is religion private, but what may seem to
common sense as Mrs. Smith's extreme or aberrational belief that
homosexuals are evil freaks of nature cannot be distinguished on "objective"
grounds from another Mrs. Smith's religious belief that many gay
relationships involve men who use each other only for personal satisfaction
rather than cherishing each other in love, and that she should be discouraging
such relationships out of concern for men's souls. 114 Most postmodern
theories do not resolve this dilemma. In place of the "either-or" scientism of
the modem view of religion and moral beliefs, they substitute the notion that
human persons, their values, and their relationships are merely matters of
cultural construction, again immune from criticism because there can be no
109 See Jean L. Cohen, Is there a Duty to Protect Privacy? Love, Sexual Orientation and
the Construction ofIdentity, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 47, 118-19 (1996).
110 Id.
III See id.
112 See generally Melody Torbati, The Right of Intimate Sexual Relations: Normative
and Social Bases for According it "Fundamental Right" Status, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1805,
1828-29 (1997).
113 GEDIcKs, supra note 39, at 32.
114 See id. at 30 (arguing that identification of religious knowledge with subjectivity
means that the government may make value judgments based only on secular "objective"
constructions of reality).
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
objective "proof' of the superiority of one cultural construction over
another. 
1 15
Even if this civil rights battle is moved to another ground, the fight over
human dignity, the postmodern dilemma does not disappear. If all values are
culturally constructed and situated and none can be proven more "true" than
another, then the debate about whether Mrs. Smith's humanity and dignity
are more violated by forcing her to rent against her conscience than her
tenants' dignity is violated by their being shamed and denied a home is
similarly irresolvable. Unless, of course, the majoritarian or marketplace
solutions are resolutions; but human rights advocates, no matter which rights
they advocate, have been implacably committed against majority political
rule or economic coercion as appropriate resolutions to the question of
human rights.11
6
Michael McConnell, for one, has proposed another option, at least in
respect to religious rights. He argues for abandonment of the Free Exercise
imagination, which focuses on individual liberty, choice, and personal
fulfillment, all more reminiscent of the value of human autonomy than of
human dignity per se. 117 Rather, he argues for a return to an original
understanding that religious liberty embodies the state's recognition of the
believer's conscience, the notion that the believer's dissent comes from his or
her responsibility to the Divine. 118 Decrying an individualist view of
religion, McConnell calls for a return to Madisonian understandings of the
dual claims of the two sovereigns, Lord and state, upon the human
conscience:
Far from being based on the "respect for the person as an
independent source of value," the free exercise of religion is
set apart from mere exercise of human judgment by the fact
that the source of value is prior and superior to both the
individual and the civil society. The freedom of religion is
115 See MINDA, supra note 96, at 237-38, 240, 245 (describing critical ironist theory);
see also Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Incommensurability and Expression, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1687, 1689 (1998).
116 But see Gardbaum, supra note 115, at 1688-89 (arguing that incomparability of
values does not give any more justification for entrusting the choice of values to elites than it
does to majorities).
117 See Michael W. McConnell; Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHL L. REV.
115, 170, 172-73 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads]; Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409,
1491-93 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
118 See Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We have Killed Him!" Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 163, 167-78 [hereinafter McConnell,
God is Dead]; McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1493-99.
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unalienable because it is a duty to God and not a privilege of
the individual. The free exercise clause accords a special,
protected status to religious conscience not because religious
judgments are better, truer, or more likely to be moral than
nonreligious judgments, but because the obligations entailed
by religion transcend the individual and are outside the
individual's control. 1
19
Thus, far from being a matter of the religious believer's taste, the
exercise of religious dissent acknowledges a chosen relationship of
surrendered freedom which impels the believer to say, "we must obey God
rather than men."
In this founding vision, according to McConnell, the "must" is the critical
turn of phrase in this demand. 120 It captures the ideal of "soul liberty," that
"the only way that unregenerate man can come to faith and salvation is
through the intervention of God" 121 and that "each person is free to pursue
the good life in the manner and season most agreeable to his or her
conscience, which is the voice of God." 122 McConnell hopes to return to the
founders' conviction that none of us can know what the divine calls each
person to know, feel, believe or do. 123 His argument would recall the
founders' demand for the necessary humility human governors must exercise
in light of the reality that their own religious experiences are, at best, partial,
and that their power to force a violation of another's conscience is a
deliberate slap in the face of the divine who ordained and nurtured that
conscience.
124
Moreover, this sense of religious freedom captures a mood of public
acknowledgment that, as a matter of fidelity to a gracious Other, the believer
is as inexorably drawn to responsive obedience as a child is drawn to respect
her parents' expectations created out of love for her well-being, even when
that obedience entails suffering imposed by a hard-hearted community.
Moreover, to force such persons to refuse to give such obedience is to force
them to be inauthentic--a hypocrite in Jefferson's terms in the Bill for
Establishing Religious Liberty--to force them not to be the persons whom
119 McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1497; see also McConnell, God is Dead,
supra note 118, at 169, 170.
120 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1496-97 (quoting Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance); McConnell, God is Dead, supra note 118, at 170-7 1.
121 McConnell, God is Dead, supra note 118, at 170.
122 Id. at 171.
123 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1498-99; McConnell, God is Dead,
supra note 118, at 167-71.
124 McConnell, God is Dead, supra note 118, at 167-68; see McConnell, Origins, supra
note 117, at 1497-98.
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they were called to be by the Divine. 125 Or to use a Madisonian metaphor, to
force compliance against conscience, particularly in religious observance, is
to invade the jurisdiction of the Universal Sovereign. 126 It is to disrupt the
divine design for human community and history. 127
McConnell's return to the original vision expressed by both Jefferson and
Madison in core foundational documents is a compelling one, except perhaps
to those who do not accept the possibility of the religious base on which it is
founded. For one who demands that the state recognize that there is no God,
the notion that a believing citizen can act out of a sense of loving obligation
in violation of state law may seem impossible, for the relationship which
compels the violation cannot exist. However, for those who concede that the
state's agnosticism about the existence of the Divine is most likely to
preserve religious equality and mutual recognition in a highly religiously
pluralistic culture, an expectation that the state proceed as if the religious
believer could be-4hough she need not be--telling the truth that she is
impelled to act out of this external relationship is no more religiously partial
than expecting the state to assume that the religious believer is "sincere"
when she claims she is motivated by religious belief. Like a person's
sincerity, a relationship with the Divine is not provable by any means that all
inquirers in a religiously pluralistic world would accept as indubitable-not by
science, reason, or experience.
Thus, the state's decision to proceed as if a believer's relationship with
God (or a non-believer's lack of one) could be, but not that it must be, true is
at least as likely to produce a religiously "neutral" or "equal" response to
both religious and atheistic beliefs as any other set of assumptions.
Moreover, the state's willingness to recognize thepossibility of the believer's
relational obligation (as well as the equal possibility of its nonexistence) best
meets the political exhortation of the framers that those who exercise power
should similarly be persons of the deepest humility about the limits of their
knowledge about the true and the good.
However, the framers' argument must be recognized not only on behalf
of Mrs. Smith, but also for her tenants in this debate, as a matter of religious
equality and human dignity, another value protected by the non-
discrimination principle. The framers' message is that there are no
125 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in ARuN M.
ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMEciCH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE
CONSTruTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAuSES app. 1, at 110 (1990); McConnell, God
is Dead, supra note 118, at 169-71.
126 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against ReligiousAssessments 1785,
in ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 125, app. 1, at 105; McConnell, God is Dead, supra note
1 18, at 167-69.
127 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in ADAMS &
EMMERIcH, supra note 125, app. 1, at 110.
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compelling grounds on which to argue that Mrs. Smith's religious vision is
any more true than her prospective tenant's, if it is truly borne out of
relationship with the Divine and not simply on autonomous law. That is,
though Mrs. Smith may argue that she is following the law "written on her
heart," the founders' message is that governors can say with no certainty that
the law written on her heart will be identical to the law written on her
prospective tenant's heart. 128 Governors must admit the reality of this"religious" experience of the other, even if the tenant would not immediately
describe his or her sense of compelled obedience to conscience in
traditionally religious terms-that is, even if the tenant would not say (in
Mrs. Smith's religious language), "God tells me (directly, through God's
Word, or otherwise) that I have an obligation to live with and care for my
partner."
This re-visioning of the conflict as a conflict of consciences has
seemingly escaped the notice of most who are balancing the rights and harms
in the Mrs. Smith-Jones conflict. They overlook the fact that the
commitment gay and lesbian couples have toward each other may well have
developed from precisely the same kind of communitarian virtues and even
religious commitments that inspire Mrs. Smith to turn down her prospective
tenant for conscientious reasons. Even those who have argued for parallels
have not quite captured, in my view, what may be at stake for both the couple
and Mrs. Smith. William Eskridge has gone perhaps farthest, arguing that
those who identify with religious and sexual communities have both common
community and personal characteristics. 129 As communities, religious and
sexual "nomic subcommunities"
have value-laden visions for the lives of their members and
for the larger society as well. They tend to be... people
bonded by associations that preserve and develop a common
normative heritage. Nomic communities have a vision of
what is ethically right. That evolving vision constitutes an
internal law that guides the lives of their members .... 130
Both [religious and sexual orientation] are characterized by
bonding with a cohort of people linked by similar emotions
128 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1498-99, McConnell, God is Dead,
supra note 118, at 169-70; James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, 1785, in ADAmS & EMMERiCH, supra note 125, app. 1, at 104. For a discussion
of the Protestant idea that law of the "golden rule" is written on the hearts of all persons but
that human beings are consistently disobedient, see GEORGE W. FoRELi, THE PROTESTANT
FArrH 36-41 (1960).
129 Eskridge, Coming Out, supra note 27, at 2416-17.
130 Id at2413.
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and belief... [and] institutionalized, albeit in different ways
131
As identifiers of human individuality, "Religious and sexual orientation
... are identities based upon beliefs, feelings, cognitions and emotions ....
[they are] dependent upon the ability and willingness both to express the
identity and to engage in activities characteristic of the identity .... Both are
spiritual as well as moral ... .- 132 Eskridge argues that neither identity is
either completely voluntary or biologically predetermined, but rather that
each comes from "feelings we do not consciously process or understand.
'133
I would extend Eskridge's understanding, both of the "nomic
community" from which a gay and lesbian couple come, and of the nature of
the individual right that they seek to uphold in their conflict with Mrs. Smith,
which does not necessarily differentiate them from Mrs. Smith, even if they
do not hold to traditional religious views.
Even if it is true that the "nomic [gay/lesbian] subcommunity" has
"value-laden visions for the lives of their members and for the larger society"
and is "bonded by associations that preserve and develop a common
normative heritage,"' 134 Eskridge acknowledges elsewhere that many,
perhaps most, gay and lesbian people participate in many other "nomic
subcommunities" which probably look more like Mrs. Smith's nomic
communities than differ from them. 135 In addition to traditional religious
communities, where they are well represented, even though sometimes
underground and sometimes in "renegade" congregations, 136 gay and lesbian
family members participate in moral/social communities that surround their
workplaces, their children's schools, the causes they espouse and the interests
they pursue in their non-working hours. 137 There is no immediate reason to
suppose that the public communities that shape their consciences differ in
kind from those that shape Mrs. Smith's, even accepting the radically
131 Id. at 2419-20.
132 Id at 2417-19.
133 Id at2419.
134 Id. at 2413. Eskridge's report seems consistent with what other authors have
suggested. See, e.g., Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social
Constructionism, 93/94 SoCIALIST REV. 9 (1997).
135 WILIAM ESKRoGE: THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 8-9 (1996).
136 David Van Biema et al., Out of the Fold?; The Debate Over Gay Ordination and
Same-sex Unions Poses a Critical Choice for Mainline Protestants: Embrace or Schism?
TIME, July 3, 2000, at 48, available at 2000 WL 22697694.
137 Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay Families Come Out, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 50,
available at 1996 WL 13455272 (describing gay and lesbian couples' difficult encounters in
their families' social settings, such as sports, recreational activities, and school).
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different moral conclusions each draws from his or her experiences in those
kinds of communities.
Second, Eskridge's description of the "identity" interest of gay and
lesbian tenants, which is in line with modem views of the autonomous self,
does not tell the whole story either. At stake for conscientious gay and
lesbian partners is not simply the negation of an "identit[y] based upon
beliefs, feelings, cognitions and emotions." 138 At stake may well be the
same kind of "call of the Other" that is at stake for Mrs. Smith, as for any
heterosexual married couple. Mary's conscientious sense that she must be
faithful to Martha even at great social and economic cost to herself is not best
characterized as an internal choice that she makes, based solely on her own
emotional and other needs, preferences and values. Her faithfulness is
brought forth by the call of Martha's need, the demand of Martha's person
for a committed response of love. That there is a relationship, and in some
religious traditions even an identity, between the call of the Divine and the
call of the needy Other, is clear. 139 However, even a secularist in a
committed relationship can attest that he or she finds him/herself impelled to
risk and suffer, even to break the law, at the call of the Other. Through any
number of exceptions, including the spousal privilege, the law recognizes this
sense that one is called by the Other to invert the usual demands of the
law. 140
Again, the founders' recognition of the claims of conscience as the key to
religious liberty provides no clear way to distinguish or prefer Mrs. Smith's
belief that she is called by God to refuse to cooperate in an unmarried
couple's evil, the religious couple's belief that they are called by God to love
each other for a lifetime, and the secular couple's belief that their partner's
need and self calls them to commitment in an intimate, lifelong relationship.
It may well be, of course, that the unmarried partnership that Mrs. Smith
is rejecting has nothing to do with the Joneses' conscience at all; it may
simply be a matter of personal taste and preference-she happens to prefer
this person and this arrangement to any other, and does not like people telling
her what her choices and preferences should be. But if Mrs. Smith is granted
the possibility of conscientious action which is compelled out of her loving
138 Eskridge, Coming Out, supra note 27, at 2418.
139 In those religious traditions that understand the Divine to be other than the self or the
neighbor, there is still often an unbreakable link between what one owes God and what one
owes the human Other. In Christian traditions, one way of describing this relationship has
been to say that through natural law accessible to every person in her conscience, God calls all
human beings to respond to God and to the neighbor's need in love. See FORELL, supra note
128, at 38, 129.
140 See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage,
81 VA. L. REv. 2045, 2067-88 (1995) (describing the spousal privilege as making a statement
about the priority of obligation to one's spouse).
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obedience to the Divine, so must the couple who--even against a religious
majority's argument--believe that their relationship is dictated by their own
conscience, whether it is expressed in distinctively religious terms or not.
In a situation of such uncertainty and direct conflict of conscience, the
religious freedom proposals of McConnell and voluntarists like Tom Berg1 4 1
are tempting. Berg has artfully exposed the dilemmas of postmodern
readings of the Free Exercise Clause;142 but he is uncomfortable accepting
the ambiguity of the postmodem solution and its reliance on contextual
interpretation. 143 Instead, he proposes a fair clarity in the voluntarism
principle. 144 If government is uncertain about whether there are relationships
to the Divine (or Others) that might be morally prior to the state's demands,
and is dedicated to humility about its competence to adjudicate between
them, a theory of non-interference seems to be the most sensible. 145 In this
view, the government should not intercede to require Mrs. Smith to rent her
room to the Jones couple, nor should it reward Mrs. Smith for her decision to
refuse rental, either symbolically or tangibly. After all, the government's
failure to act would seem to signal that it respects the possibility that either
one litigant or the other might be correct, or at least that it is incompetent to
decide who is. I would argue that voluntarism is an inadequate response to
the problem of conflicts in conscience that implicate public policy.
Voluntarism may accede in a formal way to the possibility that either the
landlord or tenant may be right about what conscience compels, but it does
not account for the anthropological dilemma which lies behind any number of
the Free Exercise cases, and certainly no less in the Smith v. Jones dilemma.
Voluntarism accedes to the possibility that each side might be compelled by
conscience, an important concession to get religious rights a hearing, rather
than relegating them to the status of private tastes or legally noncognizable
rights. However, voluntarism does not fully account for the possibility that
each side might not be compelled by conscience, as well. This is a critical
issue for a doctrine of religious freedom forged out of a Reformation
anthropology. 146 For the anthropology--and indeed the theology-of the
Reformation is critically focused on the dual reality that human
understanding is a divine gift and that God's expectations are indeed "written
on the heart" of every person, and at the same time, that understanding is
141 See Berg, supra note 92.
142 Id
143 See id. at 693-94.
144 Id at 694-95.
145 Id at 736-37.
146 For a general discussion of the Protestant understanding of the human condition, see
FORELL, supra note 128, at 123-58;
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corrupted by the human will to self-justification and self-interest. 147 The
theology of the Reformation-the understanding of the relationship of the
human person to the divine--is necessarily off limits in a religiously
pluralistic culture. Yet, its theory of human nature, recognizing that human
beings are both good and evil and their understandings and wills are both
trustworthy and corrupt, is one that can be acceded to by both religious and
secular persons, since a wide variety of sources substantiate this judgment,
including experience, reason, history, the arts, even science. 148
I would probably agree with Berg that, if we could only choose between a
religious freedom theory that accorded respect to claims of conscience,
risking "fakers" (as voluntarism does) or a theory designed to avoid free
riders or religious preferences at the risk of harming those divinely called,
voluntarism is preferable. However, the best resolution of the Smith v. Jones
case accounts for four possibilities: that Mrs. Smith is acting from conscience
and the Joneses are not; that the Joneses are acting from conscience and Mrs.
Smith is not, and finally, that both or neither are acting at the behest of
Another who calls them inexorably to a moral life. In a different case, where
Mrs. Smith or the Joneses are up against the state, awarding the individual
the whole panoply of remedies may be necessary. The absoluteness of the
state's power may well make state officials so arrogant or complacent that
they are unlikely to question their own judgments without an immense
constitutional show of force checking them. However, in an individual rights
versus rights case, awarding both the right and full remedies to either Mrs.
Smith or the Joneses is not likely to get them (or us) to ask whether they are
indeed vindicating a right of conscience or not.
III. THE REMEDIES RESPONSE:
AN EXERCISE IN SLOW MORAL CONVERSATION
As I have suggested, voluntarism does not fully account for the
possibility that Mrs. Smith and her tenant not only might be persons of
conscience, but also that they might not. Or more precisely, it abandons to
the private sphere the moral duty to challenge both Mrs. Smith and her tenant
on the question of whether they are indeed conscientiously compelled out of
relationship to God or Another to make the stand they do, or whether self-
interest, stubbornness, pride, or simply prejudice drives their decisions. The
state does not put Mrs. Smith and her tenant into a room, as it were, and
expect them to "duke it out," conscience to conscience. If one of them is
indeed wrong (or if both of them are), an assumption which refuses the
"common sense" that conscientious choice is merely a taste and not a matter
of truth, then he or'she will never come to know that fact.
147 Id at 125-29; GusTAFWINGREN, LunimoNVocAnoN 123-24 (Carl C. Rasmussen,
trans., 1957).
148 WINGREN, supra note 147, at 36-38, 42-50.
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This lack of accountability through law might not be a real problem if
American society had enough independent mediating institutions with
sufficient moral standing in the entire community that both Mrs. Smith and
her tenants could be called to account for their positions. But if there is such
a form of institution pervasively situated in American culture that currently
has both the moral authority and the courage to call a recalcitrant Mrs. Smith
on the phone and ask her to meet up with her tenant to see who is morally
right, I do not know of it. (One can hope, of course, and imagine possibilities
for nurturing such institutions in religious communities, local community
groups, and quasi-governmental institutions such as public education).
On the other hand, strong state compulsion, such as the threat of a jail
term or a stiff financial penalty such as a large damage award, may similarly
never require Mrs. Smith and her tenant to face each other as moral persons
and take account of the possibility that the moral position of the other person
is the correct one. If Mrs. Smith is acting out of prejudice or self-interest
instead of the relational demands of conscience, forcing Mrs. Smith to take
the tenant will simply reinforce her mistaken impression that she is acting out
of conscience. In her mind, it may simply give her an excuse to claim victim
status, as the lone individual up against the heavy legal machinery of the
state. 14 9 The modem restorative justice movement recognizes that the failure
of two contesting individuals to confront each other is not simply a moral
failure, but is likely to result in a pragmatic failure of resolution of the
conflict as well. 150
Indeed, those steering the Fair Housing Act to passage in 1968 seemed
also to fear that a demand for huge penalties against housing discriminators
would only retard, if not countermand, the progress that the very passage of
the Act signaled. The 1968 version of the Act was hard on liability and soft
on penalties in its final form. Originally, the bill proposed by Senator
Mondale as an amendment to a civil rights worker protection statute provided
for much broader enforcement options.15 1 His version of the Fair Housing
Act provided for HUD enforcement through conciliation first, followed by a
federal complaint, hearings, and finally administrative enforcement orders
backed up by judicial review. 1 52 Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen proposed to
149 See, e.g., Howard Zehr, Restorative Justice: The Concept, CORRECrIoNs TODAY,
Dec. 1997 at 68; Virginia Mackey, Restorative Justice: TowardNon-violence, 21 (a discussion
paper on crime and justice from the Presbyterian Criminal Justice Program, Louisville, Ky.
1992); Villa-Vicencio, supra note 20, at 169 (discussing Nietzsche's views that social
punishment reverses the roles of victim and perpetrator).
150 Zehr, supra note 149, at 68-70.
151 Bond, supra note 5, at 323.
152 Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2000); SEN. REir. 721, Pub. L. 90-
284, Title VIII, § 803(2) (b), 82 Stat 73 (1968), 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 100-101, 1837; 114
CONG. REC. S 134-35 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1968); Ware, supra note 13, at 72.
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soften the enforcement mechanisms of the Act in order to secure passage, as
well as to exclude certain owner/occupant-sold single family homes from its
purview. 153 After a series of eighty amendments and a debate in which
Mondale had to invoke cloture, the Act was passed with an enforcement
mechanism with substantially fewer teeth in it. 15 4
On paper, Fair Housing Act enforcement after 1968 could be achieved by
administrative HUD proceedings, state or local agency proceedings, a civil
action by the victim of housing discrimination, or pattern and practice suits
by the Attorney General.15 5 However, the only meaningful enforcement
mechanisms were administrative conciliation and private lawsuits, which had
to be pursued in state or local agencies or state courts whenever state law
gave "substantially equivalent" protections. 156 Critics of the Act also
objected to its limitations on available relief: private plaintiffs could get
injunctive relief, actual damages and up to $1000 in punitive damages, but
attorney fees and costs were limited to cases where plaintiffs could not pay
their own expenses. 157 As it turned out, the Department of Justice filed only
three hundred suits from 1968 to 1980, and under the Reagan administration,
even this small number declined. 15
8
The response of housing discrimination advocates to this failure of relief
was to demand revisions to the Act. Congress, opposed by the Reagan
administration, worked on a revision bill from 1980 to 1988, when the Fair
Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) of 1988, incorporating some parts of the
Reagan administration's counterproposals, were finally passed. 159 The 1988
153 114 CONG. REC. S3134-35 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1968), 114 CoNG. REc. S4570-73
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1968).
154 John 0. Caimore, Racelism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MLAM L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (1998); Ware, supra note 13, at 72; Bond, supra note 5, at 323-
26.
155 Ware, supra note 13, at 77.
156 Id.; see also 135 CoNG. REc. E731-02 (1989), (remarks of Rep. Edwards) available
at 1989 WL 171830; 131 CONG. REc. S3093-01 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985) (remarks of Sen.
Dole).
157 Katherine G. Stearns, Countering Implicit Discrimination in Real Estate
Advertisements: A Callfor the Issuance of Human Model Injunctions, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1200,
1209 (1994).
158 See Bond, supra note 5, at 327 (noting that while there were 5100 federal fair
housing complaints in 1982, the Reagan administration filed only two fair housing cases in
1982 and six in 1983); 134 CONG. REc. E3384-02 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) available in 1988
WL 177270 (remarks of Rev. Drinan) (describing the decades-long political action necessary
to counter Reagan administration opposition to Fair Housing Act amendments).
159 See Ware, supra note 13, at 79-80; see also Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
H. R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong. 2d Sess 1988, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2178,
available at 1988 WL 169871 (legisl. hist.).
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amendments not only expanded the list of protected classes to include
families with children and disabled persons, but significantly increased the
remedies available. 160 Administrators are not limited to conciliation, but
may impose civil penalties of up to $10,000 for a first offense, with
escalating monetary penalties for subsequent offenses. 16 1 The FHAA also
authorizes the Attorney General to file suit in cases where an "issue of
general public importance" is involved, in addition to pattern and practice
suits. 162 Private rights of action may be brought up to two years after the
discrimination occurs, and courts may award not only damages and injunctive
relief, but civil penalties up to $50,000 for a first violation and $100,000 for
any subsequent violation. 1 63
The Act's original limited enforcement mechanisms, particularly its weak
federal enforcement procedures and its extension of the Mrs. Murphy
boardinghouse exemption to owner-occupied four-plexes and owner-sold
single family residences was not merely a concession to recalcitrant
conservative arguments that government has no business telling private
property owners what to do with their property. 164 It also signaled that,
while the government was willing to throw its symbolic weight against racial
discrimination and declare it morally wrong as a matter of American social,
political and economic policy, it was willing to do so only against opponents
who were fairly matched. The compromising Congress was not willing to
send the federal government against widowed Mrs. Murphys but only against
those commercial businesses which assumed the risk of regulation simply by
entering the marketplace. 165
The Mrs. Murphy exemption recognized that the symbolic, economic,
and personal oppression that a large commercial landlord could wreak upon a
black person or couple far outweighed the harm that a Mrs. Murphy could
cause by refusing, even out of the bitterest motives, to rent to them. 166
160 See Ware, supra note 13, at 81, 87; H.R. REP. No. 711.
161 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2000).
162 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (1981); see also H. R. REP. No. 711; but see 134 CoNG. REC.
S 10544-02 (daily ed, Aug. 2, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch on importance ofjury trial
amendments) available at 1988 WL 174369.
163 See Ware, supra note 13, at 81.
164 114 CONG. REC. S3345, 3346 (1968) (remarks of Sens. Long and Stennis); 114
CONG. REC. S2533 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
165 But see Walsh, supra note 1, at 632 (arguing that discrimination by a"grandmotherly
woman" would be just as harmful as a larger landlord, and quoting Senator Mondale's
comment that "segregated housing is the simple rejection of one human being by another
without any justification but superior power.").
166 See Walsh, supra note 1, at 609. Senator Mondale estimated that the Mrs. Murphy
provision applied to two million of the nation's sixty-five million housing units, 114 CONG.
REc. S3424 (1968).
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Indeed, the Mrs. Murphy exemption anticipated that Mrs. Murphy could not
even draw social strength for her prejudices from her surrounding culture: by
making the exemption narrow enough, Mrs. Murphy would be a morally
isolated island of prejudice in a commercial sea of fair housing behavior.
As I have suggested, the crafters of the Fair Housing Act may also have
carefully managed the remedies available to victims of discrimination to
reflect the much more evenly divided social view at the time about whether
racial discrimination was morally reprehensible. The testimony of Senators
such as Sam Ervin and John Stennis on the floor of the Senate reflects the
fact that even Congress was divided about the moral wrongfulness of housing
discrimination, and that the bill was a racial compromise. 167 The first Fair
Housing Act provided largely for remedies that would encourage landlords to
make changes of their own volition, rather than forcing them into the posture
of victims. 16 8 Taking the good faith of the landlords for granted and
assuming that once informed, they would do the right thing, the Act provided
for informal responses such as "conferences, conciliation and persuasion" as
a mandatory first step. 169 Moreover the Act's remedies were largely
prospective in nature, focusing on declaratory, injunctive, and ameliorative
approaches through damages, rather than punitive awards such as treble
damages. As time went on, however, Congress imposed ever-increasing
penalties upon what was coming to be commonly recognized as the odious
act of racial discrimination. 170
In hindsight, the weakness of the 1968 Fair Housing Act is perhaps quite
properly viewed as a deficit from the beginning, though as I have suggested,
whether proposed hard-charging, punitive-oriented or the actual soft-pedaled
incremental enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts would have resulted in
more substantive equality for African Americans still remains a historical
debate. Yet, the magnitude of the problem faced by Fair Housing Act
proponents may account, at least in part, for why "softer" remedies were
unsuccessful in meeting the promise of the Act. Unlike the current debate
over unmarried tenants, which is mostly conducted in individual rights terms
and involves scattered individual landlords, the authors of the Fair Housing
Act well knew more was at stake than individual harms suffered by black
167 - See remarks of Sens. Ervin and Stennis, supra notes 1-2.
168 See Ware, supra note 13, at 63.
169 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1981).
170 See 134 CONG. REC. S10544-02, (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (remarks of Sen.
Thurmond, noting the "remarkable compromise" across political interests on the Fair Housing
Act Amendments of 1988) available at 1988 WL 174369. In addition to these changes,
Congress has considered subsequent amendments that broaden the scope of the act to include
criminal penalties for violating fair housing civil rights, such as the use of firearms or fire to
intimidate people exercising their rights. See 136 CONG. REC. H9114-01 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1990) (remarks of Rep. Sensenbrenner) available at 1990 WL 206290.
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renters and home buyers: the Act was literally focused on changing
ensconced segregative housing patterns that were severely damaging
American social life for everyone, not just those denied housing. 171 The Fair
Housing Act was directed at what was deemed to be at the root of other
problems including employment discrimination, segregated and inferior
public education for African Americans, civil unrest in the cities, crime, and
other ills. 172 The history following the passage of the Act demonstrates that
many of the truly tragic seemingly intractable problems of minority
communities, including depressed and crime-ridden urban cores, inadequate
public education and the lack of adequate employment for urban minorities
were not substantially alleviated by the reality of Fair Housing Act
litigation, 173 even though its proponents' dream that equal housing
opportunity might ward off some of the worst of these problems was not at
the time so far-fetched.
In the Smith v. Jones controversy, what was a telling failure of the
conciliatory/actual damages approach in the Fair Housing Act may hold the
best possibility for success in resolving Justice Scalia's Kulturkampf
174
represented by the religious landlord/gay tenants dispute. The right to equal
housing opportunity for unmarried couples is not necessary to resolve the
complex social and economic problems that race-based civil rights statutes
were aimed at, and perhaps not even the extensive problems in gaining social
and economic equal opportunity that the disability statutes were intended to
address.175 The marital status nondiscrimination statutes are largely aimed at
the symbolic and attendant material harms flowing from a moral conflict
about the public worthiness of both the individuals and relationships
involved, harms for which there are analogies in the African American civil
rights movements, but only analogies.
In conflicts where the symbolic harms are easily as important or more
important than the economic ones, such as in the gay tenant/religious
171 See Ware, supra note 13, at 61-62.
172 See Deborah Kemp, The 1968 Fair Housing Act: Have Its Goals Been
Accomplished?, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 327,332 (1986).
173 See Bond, supra note 5, at 327-28.
174 Eskridge, supra note 27, at 2413-14.
175 See Nancy Lee Firak, Threshold Barriers to Title I and Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Discrimination Against Mental Illness in Long-Term Disability Benefits,
12 J. L. & HEALTH 205, 212 (1998) (describing purpose of the ADA as to defeat discrimination
ranging from intentional exclusion of disabled people to the discriminatory effects of non-
accessible facilities). When the 1988 amendments were passed, several Senators spoke about
the pervasive effects of housing discrimination on the opportunities of the disabled, see 134
CONG. REc. S 10544--02 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (remarks of Sens. Simpson, Hatch, Stafford,
Moynihan, McCain, et al.) available at 1988 WL 174369; see also Clegg, supra note 4, at
1610-11.
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landlord dispute, the Fair Housing Act strategy of initially using mild
remedies, followed by ever-stronger ones, may best respond to the practical
reality that people are divided on the question of gay relationships. The
approach of conciliation with the potential teeth of actual damage awards
may hold out the best hope for respecting the moral conscience of both
parties involved, while also strongly encouraging them to talk with each other
about their respective moral positions, because neither wields the full weight
of the power of the state. Such dialogue may not erase their disagreements
but may at least help discussion to be conducted in a respectful and civil
manner. In such cases, a remedies approach portends more hope than a
liability approach can give.
The option of abandoning the moral field to the private sector is, as I
have suggested, not likely to give equal respect to the conflicting views of the
participants in this battle. Failure to give a civil right--a "liability right"--to
the tenants eludes the possibility for the confrontation between consciences.
Although too much can be made of the uneven bargaining power of a small
landlord as compared to her potential tenants, the fact is that Mrs. Smith is
"one-up" on her tenants because she is able to pronounce her moral judgment
"with teeth," which means that the tenants may well be stigmatized and
emotionally harmed. She is expressing her moral judgment in a situation
where she has an important good to give or deny, a good which has more than
economic value to them as the place they have searched out to make their
family's home. As suggested previously, even without being overly romantic
about the human nesting instinct, for most couples, the choice of a particular
home, even a short-term apartment that resembles hundreds like it, is
peculiarly tied up with a sense of their personhood, just like their heirlooms
or clothing. To suggest that the denial of the sense of the safety that one's
chosen home confers is the equivalent of denying them merely an economic
bargain flies in the face of most humans' experience of searching for home.
Granting the liability right to the tenants, but the remedy advantage to the
landlord has prudential advantages in the culture wars. If we assume that
Mrs. Smith (and her tenant) might be right and might be wrong about what
the Divine or the need of the other compels, to give Mrs. Smith's tenants
some leverage to confront her conscience forces her to ask whether she
indeed is exercising her right of conscience or simply her prejudices, because
she will have to pay for her choice. She will pay not only in actual damages,
but in the confrontation with the community which labels her act as legally
wrongful. Indeed, we may presume that if Mrs. Smith is hiding behind a
prejudice, she may be forced out of the closet if she has to choose between
renting to these tenants without incident or facing the public condemnation of
legal liability.
On the other hand, if her tenants are simply on a power trip to punish
Mrs. Smith for her religious disapproval, limiting their remedies is also more
likely to smoke them out. If they have been insulted, but not significantly
harmed, by Mrs. Smith's disapproval and refusal to rent, they are unlikely to
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pursue the insult through the courts when their only recovery can be actual
damages. Indeed, an actual damage remedy may force them to ask how
much they have indeed been damaged, and reduce what may initially seem
like an egregious wrong to its proper emotional place in their lives. To make
sure that they too are tested on whether their claim is one of conscience or
human rights, initially actual damages should be limited by the mitigation
principle: tenants should be required to show that they have lost something
tangible. 176 Thus, at least in the initial legislation, damages for the expense
of finding another apartment, including lost wages and travel, should be
included, while damages for emotional distress or dignitary harms should not.
As social consensus on the wrongfulness of discrimination solidifies, statutes
can be amended to add damages for dignitary and emotional harm, and
perhaps punitive damages to reflect society's condemnation of discriminatory
acts.
Moreover, the elimination of injunctive remedies in early legislation will
serve to protect the most important conscientious claims of both Mrs. Smith
and her potential tenants. As the McConnell argument points out, Mrs.
Smith's best defense against the marital status statute is that she will be
coerced into abandoning her religious or moral beliefs, and forced to
participate in evil. If the tenants cannot force Mrs. Murphy to rent to them
but can only collect actual damages, Mrs. Smith's complaint becomes only
that she should not have to pay a cost for her religious beliefs, even the cost
of the harm she has visited upon the Jones couple.
Mrs. Smith's demand to be excused from even actual damages through
an exemption is out of step with Free Exercise jurisprudence in two ways.
First, that jurisprudence reflects an expectation that religious dissenters pay
significantly higher costs to exercise their religious beliefs when they are out
of step with important state values than when they are not. In some cases,
this implied requirement that a Free Exercise claimant show some
willingness to sacrifice for her beliefs, such as to live on unemployment
benefits rather than her salary as Mrs. Sherbert did, is an indirect test of
religious claimants' sincerity-a way to smoke out those claimants who use
religion to obtain free rider status from generally applicable
responsibilities. 177 (Indeed, successful Free Exercise claims have been
largely limited to those cases where the price of asking for a religious
exemption is substantially weightier than Mrs. Smith's; even the potential
176 A more difficult question is whether a lost benefit of the bargain should be awarded.
See, e.g., Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d 754, 758 (1973) (Tenant
proved that she was required to rent a similar apartment for $30 more per month for a year).
However, Zahorian's damages for $750 for pain and suffering would not be cognizable under
this approach. Id.
177 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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loss of one's business, such as in Braunfeld,178 or job, as in Smith,17 9 have
• been expected prices for following one's beliefs.) From a theological point
of view, if her religious claims simply seem to line up with personal gain or
preference, Mrs. Smith's religious and moral community should be
questioning her on whether she is simply justifying herself using religion as a
means to her self-interested end, or whether she is indeed following the
demand of the Other.
In other cases, the requirement that Free Exercise claimants themselves
show some personal sacrifice has served as a recognition that conscience
claims coming out of a deep, sacrificial commitment to a divine Other or a
religious community are more socially valued, and indeed, perhaps more to
be trusted as truth-telling about the wrongfulness of the community's laws,
than religious claims that seem simply to further the claimants' self-interest.
Even in a secular sense, a sacrificial claim of conscience-a civil
disobedient's willingness to go to jail, for example--is more likely to morally
engage and instruct the community on what it means to be a virtuous citizen
and what the community's moral response to a social dilemma should be than
a religious claim that seems simply to mimic self-interest, such as refusing to
pay taxes. I would not want to go so far as to suggest that substantial
sacrifice should be required of Free Exercise claimants, as the Supreme
Court sometimes seems to do. But the imposition of a moderate sacrifice on
Mrs. Smith as a price of her (state-sanctioned) conscientious objection should
not automatically spell constitutional relief for her.
Finding against Mrs. Smith on liability but limiting her damages also
responds to the problem of religious equality that lurks in each difficult case
where neither neutral laws nor religious accommodation seem to result in full
equal treatment of citizens. 180 Religious equality and neutrality advocates
worry that giving exemptions to religious claimants may grant them a
windfall that non-religious objectors do not share, or make them free-riders
on the system, 18 1 thus putting the weight of the state behind the truth of their
claims. Her secular counterpart who simply does not want to rent to gays
makes a difficult point in suggesting that Mrs. Smith is asking for special
treatment to which he is not entitled. Because a non-religious claimant
would be expected to pay for the damage he causes another by discriminating
178 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
179 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
180 See, e.g., McConnell, Origins, supra note 117, at 1419-20.
181 For example, in both the tax cases and the conscientious objector cases, one implied
area of the Court's concern is that secular and other religious claimants will have to bear
duties, such as paying taxes or losing their lives in war, that objecting religious claimants do
not. See a description of this debate in Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and A Response to Critics, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 685,727-29 (1992); see also
GEDIicKs, supra note 39, at 98, 101-02.
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
against him, to afford no redress when the perpetrator is religious sends a
message that she is considered a more valuable citizen than the victim. By
requiring some reasonable sacrifice by such objectors, like requiring Mrs.
Smith to pay actual damages, religious claimants are put somewhat on a
parity with those who cannot claim the law's exemption. Yet, if the redress
is limited to actual monetary losses, Mrs. Smith is not being asked to give up
even more-her life's work or her conscience. She is simply being asked to
give up some personal wealth for the person whom, from the secular state's
viewpoint, she has harmed. To ask for a limited personal economic sacrifice,
if she is a religious person, is probably not to ask for anything she does not do
every day, on behalf of family, religious community, and civic community.
Thus, though too much sacrifice can be and has been demanded by the
courts, 182 the "sacrifice factor" takes at least a step in the direction of the
religious equality principle.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that, in times of significant moral contest about the
existence and definition of human rights that conflict with each other, a legal
approach willing to divorce right from remedy to give some recognition of
the dignity of each person's rights claim may result in a more preferable
long-term legal outcome for human rights than to pre-empt the rights
discussion by awarding both right and full remedy to the party on one side of
the controversy. Perhaps the most important reason for doing so, including in
the conflict between the religious landlord and the gay/lesbian tenant, is that
it has the best chance of ensuring that there will be moral discussion so
necessary in our society about the rights that gay and lesbian couples, in
particular, are seeking. If Mrs. Smith is "one-up?' on her tenants with the
power to deny them a necessary and chosen good, imposition of liability for
her moral choice--assuming appropriate remedies follow-is more likely to
put both Mrs. Smith and her tenant in the position of making the moral
challenge to each other. If the tenant is truly pursuing a claim of conscience,
he will file the lawsuit and pursue the path of conciliation to get his potential
landlady to see that what she is doing wrongs him, his partner, and ultimately
the community. If Mrs. Smith knows that she will have the opportunity to
"talk back" to the unmarried couple who hope to rent from her, to share with
them her beliefs about why their relationship is wrong without state coercion,
she is less likely to dig in her heels and refuse to discuss the issues at stake,
relying on her raw power as a property owner to shut the door in their face.
She will have to pay a price for her exercise of conscience, but it is either the
182 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (requiring Orthodox Jew to give
up his business, if necessary, to follow his beliefs); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986) (requiring Orthodox Jew to choose between employment in the Armed Forces and the
requirements of his faith).
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tangible damage she inflicted upon the couple who sought her apartment, or
the price she is willing to pay through a mediated settlement. If the matter
stays in litigation, the price of her conscience will similarly be limited to
tangible harms that the tenants have actually suffered, modified by their duty
to mitigate damages.
Mrs. Smith may, of course, argue that the state is visiting a stigmatic
harm on her, claiming that her decision to exercise her conscience is
wrongful. Yet, Mrs. Smith has already made the decision that she should
"obey God rather than men." If, in her conscientious view, the state is acting
wrongly and in violation of God's will by deciding that she has
discriminated, Mrs. Smith is unlikely to view the state's "message" that she is
a wrongdoer as dispositive, or take its attempt to stigmatize her much to
heart.
Of course, the remedies approach rests upon three notions somewhat
alien to the American way of resolving problems of injustice. First, it accepts
the hard fact that the ideal solutions of the civil rights movement approach
are likely never to be realized in practice, that equal outcomes are likely
never to be achieved through law. That is, in religious terms, it accepts the
intractability of human sin, the reality that individuals will always find both
reason and justifications for stigmatizing and diminishing each other, no
matter what the law says, even while it does not accept such disrespect as
normative. Or at the least, the remedies approach recognizes that civil rights
law is an exercise in slow moral conversation, a dialogue that is unlikely to
be resolved overnight but rather requires painstaking discussion, demanding
as its (never acceptable) cost numerous victims of discrimination along the
way.
Second, the remedies approach accepts the possibility that all-or-nothing
may be wrong, that it is possible for both Mrs. Smith and the Joneses to be
right about what human dignity requires. Even though such a possibility may
seem contradictory, paradoxical and yield legal responses only with
difficulty, it may better reflect what we have come to know about living in a
diverse human community.
Third, the remedies approach rejects the assumption that the traditional
marriage of liability and remedies, which does not really force the contending
parties to confront each other's moral claims, is a preferable approach when
constitutional rights are conflicting. That is, it at least partly rejects a general
claim that the litigation model is a more publicly successful model for
defining the Constitution than mediation and other approaches. 183 While this
193 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that
adjudication can "explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as
the Constitution and statutes [and] interpret those values and... bring reality into accord with
them"); see also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
(continued)
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assumption may be true when broad constitutional claims against government
bureaucratic action are at stake, 184 it is not as apparently true when
individual rights holders are fighting each other over personal claims of
human dignity and conscience. In those cases, direct confrontation through
conciliation or mediation, with the possibility of solutions that might satisfy
the dignitary concerns of both parties, may result not only in more just
settlements, but also in a more respectful pluralism.
It must, however, be recognized that the use of mild remedies to enforce
an important human right has potential drawbacks. First, as has been borne
out by the Fair Housing Act, real wrongdoers may be tempted to gamble to
deny a renter a place to live, figuring that the tenants' costs to litigate are
likely to be more burdensome than any damages landlords will end up having
to pay out. Simple reimbursement damages do not always change behavior,
or redress wrongs, given the sacrifice that plaintiffs need to make to come
into court, as the law of punitive damages recognizes. Second, affording only
mild remedies for discrimination against unmarried couples, especially gays
and lesbians, may mean that the issue of whether such discrimination is
acceptable goes off the public "radar screen." Just as high jury verdicts and
punitive damages or massive equitable remedies (such as the breakup of
Microsoft) get people to talk about what justice really does require in our
society, so minimal damage remedies may suggest that there is no need for
public scrutiny or discussion of the issue. Finally, there are potential
psychological harms: victims may feel that the stigmatic harm visited on
them is unrecognized or delegitimated because no monetary recognition of
the harm is available, and they may feel no sense of emotional closure. There
are no easy responses to these criticisms, except to suggest restorative justice
processes that make room for apologies to victims, for discussion of both
parties' views about what is at stake, and for a perpetrator to have to look his
victim in the face.
The vision of a truly engaged discussion between opposed civil rights
claimants is, of course, optimistic, but it is surely no more optimistic than the
presumption that constitutional litigation will bring about justice for groups
who suffer from discrimination in our society. The remedies approach,
which is more likely to push competing claimants into that conversation, is
practical in one very important sense. It recognizes that human communities
resolve difficult issues over time-that the question whether sexual
orientation or behavior is a proper basis for denying a person a place to live is
not likely to be resolved in a whirlwind, as people had hoped would happen
with the Fair Housing Act. Indeed, the remedies approach recognizes that
human beings can hold just as intractably to self-interested, evil views as to
2619, 2626-36 (1995) (describing Fiss' theory as protecting a public life conception of
deliberative democracy).
184 Fiss, supra note 183, at 1085.
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morally laudable claims of conscience. Just as it takes time to tell the truth
about one part of the community's oppression of another and the complex
ways in which that community justifies that oppression, it takes time to tell
what is true in Mrs. Smith's reasons for denying a tenant a place to live, and
what is true in the tenant's right to live as she chooses.
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